The ruling, issued April 14, shut down a district court investigation that the majority said had expanded beyond its original scope. Circuit Judge Neomi Rao, writing for the court, concluded the district court's temporary restraining order lacked the clarity required to support criminal contempt charges based on the government's transfer of detainees who had already departed U.S. territory.
"The widening gyre of the district court's investigation again calls for the extraordinary remedy of mandamus to halt the judicial 'impairment of another branch in the performance of its constitutional duties,'" Rao wrote, quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 390 (2004) (cleaned up).
The case arose from events on March 14-15, 2025. President Trump invoked the 1798 Alien Enemies Act against Tren de Aragua after the Secretary of State designated it a foreign terrorist organization the prior month, determining the group was operating "at the direction" of Venezuelan authorities to "invade" and "conduct irregular warfare" against the United States. Two flights carrying suspected gang members left for El Salvador before the district court issued a class-wide TRO barring further removals. The written TRO addressed future removals but said nothing about detainees already outside U.S. territory.
The district court found probable cause for criminal contempt, reasoning the TRO was a "clear and unequivocal" command that detainees on flights already landed abroad should not be discharged from U.S. custody. The Supreme Court then vacated the TRO on venue grounds in Trump v. J.G.G., 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1005-06 (2025), and the D.C. Circuit issued a first mandamus vacating the probable cause order in J.G.G. v. Trump, 147 F.4th 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2025).
The district court continued its inquiry. It ordered declarations from all officials involved and scheduled additional hearings to determine whether then-Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem had acted "willfully" in authorizing the transfers. The court had previously represented that identifying the responsible official was the only remaining step before a referral for prosecution. The government petitioned for a second writ.
The majority held the TRO lacked the clarity necessary to support criminal contempt charges and that, because the government had already provided Noem's name, further investigation was unnecessary and improper.
Circuit Judge Walker concurred separately, reading the district court's assurance to counsel that a written order would memorialize all requirements as making the written TRO controlling. Because the written order covered only future removals, Walker concluded the government's actions regarding already-departed detainees could not constitute contempt. Circuit Judge Childs dissented, arguing mandamus was inappropriate at the interlocutory stage.