Amanda Marie Tostado pleaded guilty to two drug offenses and was sentenced to 125 months imprisonment plus supervised release. At sentencing, the district court explained Tostado would be subject to warrantless searches only with reasonable suspicion or for 'safety issues' specifically. However, the written judgment permitted broader suspicionless searches by probation officers in 'the lawful discharge of the officer's supervision functions,' far exceeding the narrow safety exception described orally.
Writing for the majority, Judge Toby Heytens found the discrepancy material because it affected when Fourth Amendment protections could be waived. 'We can imagine few more obviously material issues than when someone—including a person on supervised release—is subject to searches the Fourth Amendment would otherwise forbid,' Heytens wrote. The court rejected the government's argument that the oral pronouncement's use of 'for example' broadened the safety exception, finding that even under that interpretation, the written judgment still 'purports to limit Tostado's liberty in ways the district court did not announce in her presence.'
The case arose after Tostado appealed her sentence, claiming Rogers-Singletary violations where written judgments impose conditions not orally announced at sentencing. The government argued any error was harmless based on Tostado's plea agreement language accepting written conditions regardless of oral pronouncement, and that she failed to object to the presentence report's proposed language. The Fourth Circuit had previously dismissed other aspects of Tostado's appeal covered by her appeal waiver.
Judge Toby Heytens' majority opinion also addressed standing concerns, holding defendants have Article III standing to challenge Rogers-Singletary errors even before violating disputed conditions. Judge Rushing dissented, arguing the oral pronouncement was merely ambiguous and the written judgment properly clarified the court's intent, warning the majority's approach incentivizes 'robotic incantations' rather than helpful explanations to defendants. The case reflects ongoing tension within Fourth Circuit jurisprudence over when written judgments improperly exceed oral sentencing pronouncements.