The panel majority, written by Circuit Judge Neomi Rao, invoked the "extraordinary remedy" of mandamus to halt what the court described as an escalating judicial investigation into executive branch conduct. "The widening gyre of the district court's investigation again calls for the extraordinary remedy of mandamus to halt the judicial 'impairment of another branch in the performance of its constitutional duties,'" Rao wrote, quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 390 (2004) (cleaned up).
The dispute traces to March 14-15, 2025, when President Trump invoked the 1798 Alien Enemies Act against Tren de Aragua after determining the group was operating "at the direction" of Venezuelan authorities to "invade" and "conduct irregular warfare" against the United States. The Secretary of State had designated the group a foreign terrorist organization the prior month. Two flights carrying suspected gang members left for El Salvador before the district court issued a class-wide temporary restraining order barring further removals. The written TRO enjoined the government from removing class members but said nothing about detainees already outside U.S. territory.
The district court found probable cause for criminal contempt, reading the TRO as a "clear and unequivocal" command that detainees already in El Salvador must not be discharged from U.S. custody and transferred to Salvadoran authorities. The Supreme Court then vacated the TRO, holding the detainees' claims sounded in habeas and had to be brought in the district of confinement. Trump v. J.G.G., 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1005-06 (2025). The D.C. Circuit issued a first mandamus vacating the probable cause order in J.G.G. v. Trump, 147 F.4th 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2025).
The district court continued the investigation. It expanded the inquiry, ordering declarations from all involved officials and scheduling additional hearings to obtain information from government counsel, to determine whether then-Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem had acted "willfully" in authorizing the transfers. The court had previously represented that identifying the responsible official was the only remaining step before a referral for prosecution.
The majority held that the TRO lacked the clarity necessary to support criminal contempt charges based on the custody transfer and that, because the government had already provided Noem's name, further judicial investigation was unnecessary and therefore improper.
Circuit Judge Walker concurred separately. He focused on the district court's assurance to counsel that a written order would memorialize all requirements, reading that language as making the written TRO controlling. Because the written order covered only future removals, Walker concluded the government's conduct regarding already-departed detainees could not constitute contempt. Circuit Judge Childs dissented, arguing mandamus was inappropriate at the interlocutory stage.