Asucena Velazquez-Olais illegally entered the United States before 2018 and was subject to a Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) after a state conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to deliver. She was removed to Mexico on August 10, 2018, but has since returned to the United States without authorization. After getting her state conviction amended to simple possession, she asked immigration officials in Chicago to reopen and cancel the 2018 removal order.
Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Judge Easterbrook, joined by Circuit Judges Charles Pryor and Milan Kolar, held that an email from a deportation officer declining to revisit the order does not constitute a final order of removal subject to judicial review. "It is one thing to say, as the Justices did in Riley, that a final order of removal is reviewable even when entered through an expedited process," Easterbrook wrote. "It is quite another to suppose that an email declining to do anything about an order executed years ago is the same as an order of removal."
The court delivered its sharpest language when explaining why the petition must fail: "There is just nothing to review. The 2018 order has been executed. Once an order has been executed, it cannot be re-executed." Easterbrook emphasized that the email from the Chicago Field Office "possesses none of" the characteristics that the Supreme Court identified in Riley v. Bondi as making something an order of removal.
The case stems from Velazquez-Olais's failure to seek timely review of the original 2018 removal order. Under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a), courts of appeals can review final orders of removal, but §1252(b)(1) allows only 30 days to seek such review. After her removal to Mexico, Velazquez-Olais returned illegally and obtained an amendment of her state conviction from possession with intent to deliver to simple possession, arguing that the 28.1 grams of cocaine seized was consistent with personal use rather than distribution.
Velazquez-Olais argued that the deportation officer's email constituted a final agency decision subject to review under §1252(a)(1). But the court rejected this theory, explaining that "it is not possible to see an email from a field office as the agency's final decision, let alone as a 'final order of removal.'" The panel noted that while removal orders can be reinstated under 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(5), "the 2018 order has not been reinstated."
Instead of reopening the old order, the Department of Homeland Security has begun a new removal process by issuing a Notice to Appear last July. "A new decisional process is under way," Easterbrook wrote. "Velazquez-Olais can argue there that a conviction for simple possession of cocaine does not foreclose avenues of discretionary relief." The court noted she would have opportunities for review if the new process leads to a removal order or if she faces criminal prosecution for illegal reentry.
The ruling reinforces the jurisdictional limits on federal appellate review of immigration decisions. Courts can only review final orders of removal, not preliminary decisions or informal communications from field offices. The decision follows the Supreme Court's 2025 ruling in Riley v. Bondi, which clarified the characteristics that make administrative decisions reviewable as final orders of removal, even in expedited proceedings.