Tzul lived with his girlfriend Martha Garcia for six years before killing her and her 21-year-old brother Antonio in their Los Angeles apartment in June 2021. Police found both victims wrapped in carpets with dozens of stab wounds — Martha had 29, including wounds to her neck and lung, while Antonio suffered 37 wounds including a cut to his spinal column. Tzul fled to Mexico after placing a window air conditioning unit to blow cold air on the bodies, but was later extradited and charged with two counts of murder.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court prejudicially erred by excluding under Evidence Code section 352 a handwritten note Tzul left at the scene that read: 'I found her having sex with her own brother and that fills me with rage. I'm asking for forgiveness. I don't know whether God will do it.' As Justice Segal wrote for the unanimous panel, 'the note was the only evidence of provocation, the cornerstone of Tzul's defense' that could have reduced first-degree murder to second-degree murder or even voluntary manslaughter.

The court sharply criticized the trial court's reasoning for excluding the note, writing that 'there was no logical inconsistency in instructing the jury to consider Tzul's statement "I found her having sex with her own brother" as evidence of his state of mind, but not as evidence of whether the statement was true.' The panel emphasized that 'jurors are generally presumed to follow instructions' and rejected concerns that the jury would improperly consider the statement as proof that incest actually occurred.

Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Gustavo N. Sztraicher had initially ruled the note admissible during pretrial proceedings but reversed course after prosecutors argued it lacked foundation and would be unduly prejudicial. The judge ultimately allowed the note's admission only if Tzul testified, prompting defense counsel to move for a mistrial, stating his 'client is only taking the stand because of that ruling.'

The prosecution had argued that without Tzul's testimony establishing when he wrote the note, it provided no basis for assessing whether sufficient time had elapsed for him to 'cool off' after the alleged discovery. But the appeals court found this reasoning insufficient, noting that 'even extremely disturbing and inflammatory evidence is admissible if it is sufficiently probative.' Justice Segal wrote that the risk of jury misuse 'is significantly less where the evidence impugns the character of a homicide victim, rather than a defendant whose guilt the jury must decide.'

During his forced testimony, Tzul provided damaging details about his planning, admitting he lied to Martha about going to his mother's house, asked his brother to provide an alibi, moved his car to hide it, hid under the bed, and took a knife from the kitchen before attacking the victims. The appeals court found this testimony 'quite damaging' and concluded there was 'a reasonable chance the jury would not have convicted Tzul of first degree murder or even second degree murder absent the error.'

The court also rejected the prosecution's hearsay objections, ruling that Tzul's statement about finding the victims having sex was not hearsay because it wasn't offered to prove the truth of the matter but rather as circumstantial evidence of his state of mind. The statement about being 'filled with rage' was hearsay but admissible under Evidence Code section 1250's state-of-mind exception, the court held.