Anthony Duggan Barse was charged with robbery and reckless endangerment on December 16, 2024, and arrested two days later while on parole for a prior conviction. After his arrest, his parole was revoked and he remained in custody until pleading guilty in June 2025 to amended charges of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. The district court sentenced him to seven years total—five for aggravated assault and two for reckless endangerment—but denied him credit for the 188 days he spent in custody between arrest and sentencing.
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Fair McEvers rejected Barse's argument that he was entitled to credit for the full period in custody, explaining that the time was served for his parole violation rather than the pending charges. 'At sentencing, the district court stated Barse would receive 'no credit for time served' on the new convictions and explained that Barse had not been in custody as a result of the pending charges but rather because he violated parole for his previous conviction,' McEvers wrote.
The court firmly rejected Barse's attempt to shift the burden of proof to the state, declaring that 'the burden is on the defendant to show entitlement to additional credit for time served in custody.' The justices criticized Barse's reliance on a restitution case as 'misplaced,' noting that restitution imposes additional conditions on defendants while credit for time served does not.
The case reached the North Dakota Supreme Court after Burleigh County District Judge Bruce A. Romanick imposed the consecutive sentences in June 2025. At the original sentencing hearing, the state argued that Barse 'does not have credit in this case because that probation hold – or the parole hold was put out right away on the 18th when he was picked up.' Barse's attorney had argued his client should receive credit because he 'believed' bond was set before the parole hold commenced.
The court systematically dismantled Barse's arguments, noting that he failed to present evidence supporting his entitlement to credit. As McEvers explained, 'At most, Barse may have been entitled to credit for time served until his parole was revoked, but any time served after Barse's revocation should have applied to the sentence in the case in which he was revoked.' The court found no evidence in the record of when exactly the parole was revoked or whether Barse received credit on his previous case.
The decision reinforces established North Dakota precedent that defendants cannot receive double credit for time served and clarifies that custody time must be directly related to the charges for which sentencing occurs. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard to the sentencing decision, concluding that 'the court sentenced Barse within statutory limits and did not rely on any impermissible factor.'
The ruling provides guidance for practitioners on the burden of proof in credit-for-time-served disputes and reinforces that defendants must affirmatively establish their entitlement to such credit with evidence, particularly in cases involving overlapping custody periods from separate charges.