Southerland, whose law practice details were not specified in the brief order, had been on probation following a January 27, 2025 order from the Maryland Supreme Court that imposed a stayed 30-day suspension. The Attorney Grievance Commission and Southerland jointly moved to revoke her probation, indicating she had failed to comply with the terms set by the court.
The court found Southerland violated Rules 19-301.15, 19-407(a), (b), and (d), and 19-410 of the Maryland Attorneys' Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 19-301.15 governs safekeeping property, Rule 19-407 addresses conflict of interest rules for current clients, and Rule 19-410 covers restrictions on representing former clients. The specific nature of Southerland's underlying misconduct was not detailed in the order.
In a notable procedural decision, Chief Justice Matthew J. Fader wrote that 'the Court is not imposing the conditions precedent to reinstatement requested by Bar Counsel at oral argument because those conditions are not authorized under the Maryland Rules governing reinstatement after a definite suspension.' This suggests Bar Counsel had sought additional requirements for Southerland's return to practice beyond what the rules permit.
The case reached the Maryland Supreme Court after the initial disciplinary proceedings resulted in the stayed suspension in January 2025. The court's willingness to hear oral argument on what appears to be a consent motion suggests there were disputed issues about the appropriate sanctions or reinstatement conditions, even though both parties agreed probation should be revoked.
The Attorney Grievance Commission had apparently argued for specific conditions before Southerland could return to practice after serving her suspension. However, the court determined such conditions exceeded what Maryland's attorney discipline rules authorize for definite suspensions, limiting its ability to impose additional requirements beyond the 30-day suspension period.
The case highlights the Maryland Supreme Court's approach to attorney discipline when lawyers fail to comply with probationary terms. Rather than extending probation or imposing additional sanctions beyond what was originally contemplated, the court activated the previously stayed suspension as agreed upon by both parties.
Southerland must now serve the 30-day suspension from practicing law in Maryland. The court directed its clerk to provide notice of the order in accordance with Maryland Rule 19-761.1, which governs public notice requirements for attorney disciplinary actions. The suspension appears to be definite, meaning Southerland can return to practice automatically after 30 days without need for a reinstatement proceeding.