What happened
The Ninth Circuit on Tuesday denied a Gambian man's petition for review, holding that his federal methamphetamine-distribution conspiracy conviction was a particularly serious crime that made him ineligible for withholding of removal.
The panel said the Board of Immigration Appeals properly used Matter of Y-L-, which creates a strong presumption that drug trafficking aggravated felonies are particularly serious crimes. Judge Mark J. Bennett wrote for the panel that, "under current law, Sarr is ineligible for withholding of removal."
Sulayman Sarr argued that Loper Bright required the court to overrule Miguel-Miguel, the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision affording Chevron deference to Matter of Y-L-. The panel rejected that argument, concluding that Loper Bright did not allow a three-judge panel to discard statutory precedent merely because the earlier case used Chevron's now-overruled methodology.
Sarr became a lawful permanent resident after entering the United States on a B1 visa and marrying a U.S. citizen, then was convicted in Utah in 2021 of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The panel said Sarr transported up to about 225 grams of methamphetamine at a time over a four-month period, pleaded guilty to one conspiracy count and received a 24-month prison sentence.
After Sarr's release, immigration officials detained him and began removal proceedings. He sought asylum, withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture protection, saying he feared harm from radical Islamists in The Gambia because of statements he made about his spiritual beliefs and music.
The immigration judge and BIA concluded that the drug conviction barred asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA found that Sarr's conduct involved more than peripheral participation in essentially wholesale distribution and more than a small amount of methamphetamine.
The Ninth Circuit said the agency did not need to conduct a separate Frentescu analysis once it applied Y-L- to Sarr's drug-trafficking aggravated felony. It also rejected Sarr's constitutional-avoidance argument that the statute should be construed to forbid the agency from using a presumption without individualized dangerousness review.