California appellate court disqualifies judge from death penalty Racial Justice Act hearing

The Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, in a published opinion filed April 16, directed the Riverside County Superior Court to vacate an August 12, 2025 order by Judge Jeffrey B. Jones that had denied the disqualification request in People v. Russell Austin.

Austin was charged in 2018 with first-degree special-circumstance murder after Erica Johnson was found with her throat torn out in her apartment, according to the opinion. The People filed notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Austin subsequently filed a claim under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, and a prima facie case was found.

Austin's RJA claim alleges the District Attorney's Office "seeks the death penalty and files special circumstances charges more frequently against Black defendants than against White defendants who are similarly situated, with similar conduct," the opinion states. Austin submitted statistical data on homicide filings from 2006 through 2019.

Judge Shouka worked in the DA's homicide unit from 2015 to 2018 before her appointment to the bench. The People identified 28 cases in which they alleged Judge Shouka was involved during her time at the office. Deputy District Attorney Jared A. Haringsma, who supervised Judge Shouka from 2015 until 2018, declared that the homicide unit was "highly collaborative" and that charging decisions were made at internal meetings called "staffings."

Judge Shouka denied the disqualification grounds in her verified answer, stating her "knowledge of the procedures and processes of the DAO did not affect her ability to fairly and impartially address the issues in the RJA motion." She noted none of the 28 identified cases appeared among the 21 comparison cases in Austin's RJA motion, and that the RJA was not adopted until two years after her appointment to the bench.

Judge Jones, ruling on the disqualification request, concluded that "none of the contentions of the People appear logically related to the impartiality of Judge Shouka, and thus would not cause a reasonable (logical) member of the public to suspect bias or prejudice." He found the People had "failed to meet their burden to show facts requiring disqualification."

The appellate panel applied de novo review under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii), which requires disqualification when "[a] person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial." The court cited the standard that "a judge faced with a potential ground for disqualification ought to consider how his participation in a given case looks to the average person on the street."

Acting Presiding Justice Miller, writing for the panel, distinguished the case from a California Supreme Court Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinions advisory issued August 7, 2025. That opinion found recusal was not required for a judge who, as a prosecutor, had handled firearm enhancement cases without participating in policy development or charging decisions. The CJEO noted "the result may be different if the requesting judge, as a former prosecutor, participated in developing or directing the district attorney's policy regarding charging firearm enhancements, or was directly involved in making charging decisions, as opposed to following office policy."

The panel concluded Judge Shouka's role "was more than just following 'office policy'; she was directly involved in making charging decisions." Judge Shouka admitted she attended staffing meetings where homicide cases were discussed in detail, "including charges, legal theories and strategies," and that she made charging decisions while at the DAO.

"While we do not find that Judge Shouka was actually biased in this case, a person aware of these facts might reasonably entertain a doubt as to whether Judge Shouka could be impartial in determining if the DAO had a pattern of institutional bias, explicit bias, or historical and systematic bias in filing homicide charges, when she was personally involved in these decisions while at the DAO," the panel wrote.

The court emphasized the ruling is not categorical. "Our conclusion does not mean that Judge Shouka, or any other judge who is a former prosecutor, must be recused in every case involving the RJA," the opinion states. "Each RJA case involving a former prosecutor should be determined based on the facts and circumstances involved."

Justices Codrington and Menetrez concurred. Having granted the petition on the appearance-of-impartiality ground, the panel did not reach the People's additional arguments under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivisions (a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(A). The stay issued October 6, 2025 was dissolved.

Riverside County District Attorney Michael A. Hestrin, along with Deputy District Attorneys Emily R. Hanks and W. Matthew Murray, represented the People. Public Defender Steven L. Harmon, with Deputy Public Defenders Brian G. Cosgrove and Allison Lowe, represented Austin. The panel noted the court is reviewing the same issue in a related case, People v. Michael Mosby, case No. E086782.