The case arose from a September 2021 automobile accident in which Kevin Ray Worrell, a City of Wilson, North Carolina electrical lineman, struck a vehicle carrying Edward and Linda Breaux and Jessie and Vickie Blanchard while driving back to his Lafayette hotel after working on power restoration in Houma following Hurricane Ida. Worrell was cited for failure to yield at a stop sign, and the injured plaintiffs sued for damages totaling an undisclosed amount.
The Louisiana Supreme Court answered a certified question from the Fifth Circuit by ruling that Worrell could not claim immunity under the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (LHSEADA), which protects state employees and representatives engaged in emergency activities. Hughes emphasized that the mutual aid agreement between Louisiana and North Carolina municipalities expressly stated that Wilson personnel would 'conclusively deemed, for all purposes, to remain officials and employees of [the City of Wilson, North Carolina]' and that Wilson would perform services 'as an independent contractor.' As Hughes wrote, 'the provisions of the Mutual Aid Agreement... prohibit these entities from acting on behalf of, or as the agent of, one another.'
Hughes delivered particularly sharp language about the contractual constraints, noting that the agreement specifically provided that neither Wilson nor its Louisiana beneficiaries would 'act, or be deemed to act, as agents or partners of the other, or be acting in any joint venture.' The court concluded definitively: 'Therefore, even if a Louisiana actor had attempted to empower Mr. Worrell with some type of representative authority, it would have been ineffective, as an ultra vires act.'
The dispute reached the Louisiana Supreme Court after a federal district judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that Worrell was acting within the LHSEADA's immunity provision. U.S. District Judge Terry A. Doughty had relied on Black's Law Dictionary's definition of 'representative' and concluded that Worrell was 'standing in for Terrebonne Parish employees and acting on behalf of the parish in its hurricane recovery efforts.' The Fifth Circuit then certified two questions to the Louisiana high court, questioning whether out-of-state workers could qualify as 'representatives' and whether commuting from work sites counted as emergency activity.
The defendants had argued that Worrell should receive immunity because he was performing 'functionally the same work' as local parish employees in repairing electrical lines damaged by the hurricane. They contended that his return trip to Lafayette was 'a necessary part of the emergency preparedness activities' since hotels in Houma were unavailable. But Hughes rejected this reasoning, finding no evidence that Worrell 'received any actual or apparent authority to represent the State of Louisiana or its political subdivisions.'
Justice Cole wrote separately to propose a 'nexus test' for future cases involving the scope of emergency activities, suggesting courts should examine 'whether there is a sufficient nexus between the act at issue and the governmental mission of mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery.' Cole noted that relevant factors could include 'contemporaneousness with the declared emergency, use of a government or work-designated vehicle, and travel between designated recovery locations such as worksites or assigned lodging,' while 'purely personal errands, substantial detours, or other conduct bearing no functional relationship to the emergency mission would fall outside the statute's protection.'
The ruling sends the case back to the Fifth Circuit, which must now decide whether to affirm or reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment. The decision could affect how other states structure mutual aid agreements for disaster response, particularly regarding liability protection for out-of-state workers. Hughes noted that immunity statutes 'in derogation of the general rights of tort victims, are strictly construed,' suggesting courts should narrowly interpret such protections.