Middle District of Tennessee Denies Motions to Dismiss in Nurse Trafficking and Labor Suit

Plaintiffs Nerissa Precioso and other registered nurses sued National Health Corporation, Jeffrey R. Smith, Maria Wong, Andrew Huckabay, and Rachel Kamau in the Middle District of Tennessee. The case, docketed as 3:24-cv-00561, was assigned to Chief Judge William L. Campbell, Jr., with Magistrate Judge Holmes involved in the proceedings.

The plaintiffs allege that the defendants recruited hundreds of nurses in the Philippines to work at National Health Corporation facilities in the United States. The complaint asserts that the defendants lied to, underpaid, and forced these nurses to work in unsafe conditions.

According to the Second Amended Complaint, the defendants kept the nurses from leaving by commencing or threatening baseless legal action, changing their immigration status, and imposing serious financial harm. The plaintiffs claim the defendants used illegal contracts that offered no way for nurses to leave employment and demanded upwards of $40,000—often more than the nurses’ net annual pay—if they stopped working.

The plaintiffs brought claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Tennessee Human Trafficking Act, the Georgia RICO Act, and fraud. They also alleged violations of the Virginia Overtime Wage Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act against National Health Corporation, as well as breach of contract claims.

Defendants National Health Corporation, Smith, Wong, Huckabay, and Kamau filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the complaints failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

In a memorandum and order filed on April 15, 2026, Judge Campbell denied the motions. The court stated that, construing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and accepting them as true, the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated claims upon which relief may be granted.

The court’s order did not address the specific legal arguments raised in the defendants’ replies or the plaintiffs’ responses in opposition, but simply concluded that the motions were denied based on the sufficiency of the Second Amended Complaint.