C.P. was convicted in 1980 of oral sodomy under a since-repealed D.C. statute that criminalized all sodomy regardless of consent. The conviction stemmed from a June 1979 incident at Congressional Cemetery where C.P. and co-defendant Roy Leasure allegedly forced complainant G.D. to engage in sexual acts after giving her a ride. At trial, jury instructions specifically stated that 'consent is not a defense to sodomy' under the applicable statute, and C.P. was sentenced to three to nine years imprisonment plus lifetime sex offender registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act.
The appeals court rejected C.P.'s argument that his conviction violated substantive due process under Lawrence v. Texas, the 2003 Supreme Court decision that struck down laws criminalizing consensual sodomy. As Judge McLean wrote, the motion to vacate was barred because C.P. 'never raised the case or a substantive due process argument' in his 2004 pro se motion, filed just one year after Lawrence was decided. The court found that C.P.'s lack of legal counsel in 2004 did not constitute 'exceptional circumstances' justifying the delayed constitutional challenge.
The court was particularly dismissive of C.P.'s claim of actual innocence, noting the substantial evidence against him. As Judge McLean observed, 'C.P. does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him, given G.D.'s testimony, Mr. Leasure's statement, and the physical evidence presented at trial.' The court emphasized that C.P.'s 'choice to wait decades to raise the claim cuts against its reliability, not in support of it.'
The case reached the appeals court through a complex procedural history spanning over four decades. C.P. filed his initial direct appeal in 1981, which this court affirmed. He then filed a pro se motion in 2004 arguing the conviction should be expunged due to D.C.'s repeal of the sodomy statute, which was denied. In 2018, he challenged his sex offender registration requirements, and in 2021, he filed the Lawrence-based motion to vacate that was ultimately rejected as procedurally barred.
C.P. also failed in his challenge to the sex offender registration determination, arguing that a jury should have made findings about whether the sodomy was forcible. The court found these arguments were forfeited because C.P. didn't raise them in his original motion, and under plain error review, there was no clear legal violation. Judge McLean noted that while recent D.C. precedent in Fallen v. United States recognized Sixth Amendment jury trial rights for new SORA prosecutions, 'Fallen's holding applied to a new criminal prosecution where SORA was potentially involved, unlike C.P.'s case which had already gone to trial.'
The panel unanimously rejected C.P.'s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting the forcible nature of his conduct. Despite C.P.'s trial testimony claiming the acts were consensual, the court found adequate evidence in G.D.'s testimony that C.P. 'forced' her to commit oral sodomy and 'ordered' her to remove clothing. As Judge McLean wrote, 'where there is a direct conflict between the testimony of a defendant and that of a witness for the government, the trier of the facts has a right to accept the version of the government's witness.'
The decision highlights the ongoing legal challenges faced by individuals convicted under pre-Lawrence sodomy statutes, particularly regarding retroactive application of constitutional protections. While Lawrence established that consensual adult sodomy cannot be criminalized, this case demonstrates the limited relief available to those already convicted under the old regime. The ruling also underscores the procedural hurdles that can prevent meaningful review of decades-old convictions, even when fundamental constitutional principles have evolved significantly since the original prosecution.