Plaintiffs Rahma Salie and Michael Theodoridis were a married couple who died aboard American Airlines Flight 11 on September 11, 2001. Both were non-U.S. nationals who sued Iran in 2018 for aiding and abetting the attacks, joining a decades-long multi-district litigation.
The district court granted default judgment on their New York wrongful-death and survival claims, awarding economic damages and compensatory pain and suffering. However, it denied default judgment on their intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, concluding they had not established the tort's "severe emotional distress" element.
The Second Circuit reviewed this denial de novo, noting that Iran's default eliminated any factual disputes regarding the elements of the claim. Under New York law, a plaintiff must show extreme and outrageous conduct, intent or disregard of a substantial probability of causing severe emotional distress, causation, and severe emotional distress.
The appellate court noted that the district court had already concluded the plaintiffs established the first three elements of their IIED claims. The only remaining issue was whether they satisfied the fourth element: severe emotional distress.
The Second Circuit pointed to New York precedent allowing recovery for serious emotional trauma resulting from observing the injury or death of an immediate family member. The court noted that the district court itself had acknowledged the plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress from witnessing each other's pain and suffering, describing it as "unimaginable" and "grave."
The district court had erroneously required a sense of post-death grief or loss of the spouse's company to support solatium damages. The Second Circuit held that the relevant question for IIED liability is whether the plaintiff suffered severe, as opposed to ordinary, emotional distress—not what kind of severe distress they suffered or whether it supports a particular type of compensatory damages.
The Second Circuit reversed the denial of final judgment as to liability for the plaintiffs' IIED claims and vacated the denial of partial final judgment as to damages. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the proper calculation of damages, including an assessment of whether a prior pain and suffering award already compensated for the distinct legal injury of witnessing a spouse's assault.