Kendra Rose Levo Dion sued the Town of Bristol, its police department, Police Chief Kevin Lynch, and Officer Ashleigh Fleser after she sought police help obtaining a restraining order against her domestic partner, Felix. According to the amended complaint, Officer Fleser spoke with Felix and allegedly disclosed Dion's intention to seek the order — a breach of what Dion characterized as a duty of confidentiality. Felix then allegedly preemptively obtained a court order ejecting Dion from the home, triggering a cascade of emotional injuries that the complaint links to preexisting mental health difficulties.
U.S. District Judge Mary S. McElroy, writing for the District of Rhode Island, dismissed the claims against the Town, the police department, and Chief Lynch in their entirety. The equal-protection claim — premised on the theory that officers provided less protection to Dion because of her gender, dismissing her as emotional rather than taking her seriously — failed because the amended complaint offered only conclusory allegations from which the court could not draw an inference of discriminatory intent. The Monell claim against the Town fell for the same reason. The claim against Lynch failed because the complaint alleged no causal link between his conduct and any constitutional violation by a subordinate.
The due-process claim based on a general police duty to protect also failed. Judge McElroy examined Rhode Island General Laws section 12-29-3 and concluded that the statute's duty-to-arrest provision is triggered only when an officer has probable cause to believe a felonious assault was committed — a threshold the amended complaint did not allege was met. Absent a state-law expectation of action, there is no federal due-process claim. The court also rejected the argument that Dion stood in a special relationship with the Bristol Police sufficient to impose an affirmative duty to protect under the framework established in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), because that doctrine generally requires a deprivation of the person's ability to care for themselves — such as incarceration or institutionalization — not present here.
The one surviving thread is the state-created danger doctrine. The court noted that in a 2020 decision, 979 F.3d 65, the First Circuit formally adopted the doctrine and held that it constituted a clearly settled right capable of defeating qualified immunity. To state a claim, a plaintiff must allege that a state actor affirmatively acted to create or enhance a danger specific to the plaintiff, that the act caused harm, and that the conduct shocks the conscience; the plaintiff must also show the state actor knew of a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded it. The court noted that Dion's amended complaint did not assert a state-created-danger theory — she did not contend that Officer Fleser's disclosure increased the danger to her from Felix — but Judge McElroy gave her until May 8, 2026, to file a second amended complaint against Fleser on that theory alone, asking her to supply additional factual detail about prior violence, what she told the officer, and the specifics of her harm. The order specifies that if no second amended complaint is filed by that date, or if one is filed but fails to state a federal claim, the case will be dismissed.
The court also referenced a First Circuit case, 103 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997), involving Flor Maria Soto, whose husband Angel Rodriguez had threatened to kill her and their children. Police, aware of those threats, contacted Rodriguez and disclosed Soto's allegations. Four days later, Rodriguez killed his children. The First Circuit concluded in that case that the scenario had not violated Soto's own due-process rights. Judge McElroy cited the case to illustrate the principle that there is no federal constitutional right to have police prosecute wrongdoers — the broader legal backdrop against which Dion's remaining claim must be developed.