The case was brought by Daren Cox, proceeding pro se, against the Internal Revenue Service and Scott Bessent, Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Cox challenged a maximum entry-age requirement for a federal law enforcement position, arguing that the ADEA's general prohibition on age discrimination applied and that defendants were required to establish a BFOQ defense to sustain the age limit.
The district court, adopting in full a magistrate judge's recommendation, rejected that argument. The court held that 5 U.S.C. § 3307(d) — which authorizes agency heads to "determine and fix" maximum entry ages for law enforcement positions — is not displaced by the ADEA's general prohibition in 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). The court reasoned that § 633a(a) speaks in general terms while § 3307 speaks directly to the precise hiring practice at issue, and that Congress did not silently repeal the latter by enacting the former.
Cox had relied on Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399 (2020), and Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985), to support his position. The court held both cases inapposite: Babb addresses causation under § 633a(a), and Criswell addresses the BFOQ defense in contexts where the ADEA governs. The court held that where § 3307 applies, the age limit is not defended as a BFOQ — it is the governing rule.
Cox also argued that EEOC enforcement authority under § 633a(b) precluded the result. The court rejected that contention as well, holding that § 633a(b) governs enforcement of the ADEA but does not displace other operative statutes or prevent courts from giving effect to § 3307.
Because the controlling issue was purely legal, the court further held that Cox's arguments about additional discovery and separate consideration of cross-motions did not alter the outcome. His request for declaratory and injunctive relief failed alongside his underlying claim. The case was dismissed without prejudice. United States District Judge David A. Bragdon signed the April 17, 2026 order in case No. 1:24-CV-463.