The case centers on Winston Tyler Hencely, a U.S. Army specialist injured in a bombing at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Hencely sued Fluor Corporation under South Carolina tort law, alleging that Fluor's failure to properly supervise a worker — later identified in the proceedings as a former Taliban member — allowed explosives to be smuggled onto the base. Petitioner's counsel argued that the Army found Fluor had disregarded key contractual requirements. Fluor nonetheless argued that Hencely's claims are preempted by federal law.
Frank H. Chang, arguing for Hencely, urged the Court to read Boyle v. United Technologies narrowly, as a defense available only to contractors who follow government specifications. Because the Army found that Fluor violated the Army's instructions, Chang argued, Boyle provides no shelter. He also pushed back against broader structural preemption arguments, pointing to cases such as Little v. Barreme and Mitchell v. Harmony — in which common law claims were sustained against military officers — as evidence that the historical baseline permits such suits absent congressional action.
Mark W. Mosier, arguing for Fluor, contended that the claims are preempted because they conflict with the federal government's exclusive war-making powers under the Constitution. He argued that applying state tort duties on a foreign battlefield would inherently interfere with military operations, discourage contractors from taking necessary risks, and undermine the military's authority to calibrate its own enforcement responses. He acknowledged that his theory goes beyond Boyle, which he said addressed general procurement contracting rather than combat operations specifically.
Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, argued as amicus curiae supporting Fluor. The government's proposed test would preempt claims that arise out of the military's combatant activities and from a contractor's actions within the scope of its contract — whether or not those actions violated the contract — because, the government argued, the federal interest is harmed either way. Gannon confirmed that the uniquely federal interest branch of preemption predates Boyle and has not been disavowed by the Court.
Several justices questioned the analytical framework. Justice Kavanaugh repeatedly asked whether the baseline in an area of uniquely federal interest requires Congress to affirmatively authorize suits rather than affirmatively displace them. Justice Barrett suggested that even under a federal-enclave theory, the Court would still need to decide what federal common law rule applies, and that adopting the combatant activities exception from the Federal Tort Claims Act as a model would amount to extending that exception's text to cover contractors. Justice Gorsuch questioned whether the competing policy considerations — contractor immunity versus contractor accountability — are better resolved by Congress than by the courts. Justice Jackson noted that the FTCA's combatant activities exception does not extend to independent contractors, and that the Westfall Act similarly excluded contractors from its protections, suggesting Congress has not treated contractors as categorically immune.
Justice Kagan floated a middle-ground rule under which a contractor would be liable only if the plaintiff could show the contractor violated military policy, which Chang said his client could accept. The justices also questioned both sides on practical consequences, including the prospect of state court proceedings requiring testimony from military officers about operations at Bagram, the possibility that choice-of-law principles could lead to Afghan law governing the suit, and whether the government's state secrets privilege adequately addresses national security concerns without wholesale preemption.