Jeffrey Joel Judy, a double leg amputee who uses a wheelchair, sued Musca Properties, LLC, which owns a large shopping center in Naples, Florida. Judy alleged that when he visited the property in 2025 he encountered disabled parking spaces blocked by large built-up ramps protruding into access aisles — which he described as a dangerous falling hazard — inadequate disabled parking signage that allowed able-bodied drivers to occupy accessible spaces, and curb ramps with excessive and steep slopes leading from the parking area to the sidewalk. He sought an injunction requiring Musca Properties to make the property accessible.
Musca Properties moved to dismiss the first amended complaint, arguing Judy lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief — the only remedy available under Title III of the ADA. The company pointed to Judy's history as a repeat ADA litigant and argued his plans to return to the property were too vague and that closer locations of the same stores undercut his stated intent to revisit.
The Middle District of Florida denied the motion. Applying the Eleventh Circuit's four-factor test for future injury — proximity to the plaintiff's residence, past patronage, definiteness of return plans, and frequency of travel near the property — the court found each factor favored Judy. He lives in North Fort Myers, roughly forty miles from the Naples property in the next county over, has visited the property multiple times including as recently as October 11, 2025, stated specific plans to return in March and September 2026, and alleged he has traveled to the Naples area several times a year for more than ten years to visit beaches near the property.
On the serial-litigant question, the court found that Judy's history of filing ADA suits does not alter the standing analysis. The court cited prior decisions from Florida federal courts for the proposition that it is not implausible that a serial ADA litigant visited and intends to return to numerous businesses, and that nothing in the ADA's statutory language precludes standing for tester plaintiffs. Musca Properties also offered no evidence that Judy's specific allegations in this case were untrue.
The court also permitted Musca Properties to mount a factual attack on jurisdiction — meaning it could submit extrinsic evidence and the court could weigh it — consistent with Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that future-injury facts in ADA injunctive-relief cases are not inextricably intertwined with the merits. Even under that more defendant-friendly standard, the motion failed.
The case is Judy v. Musca Properties, LLC, No. 2:25-cv-1003-SPC-DNF, in the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division.