The four named plaintiffs — Michael Parks, Chad Sutton, Sukeena Stephens, and Freeman Jordan — are Federal Air Marshals Service employees who allege that FAMS, operating under TSA and the Department of Homeland Security, has maintained an ongoing pattern, practice, and culture of race discrimination in denying qualified African American air marshals promotional opportunities, particularly with respect to upper management positions. They brought the suit in the District of Columbia against Kristi Noem in her official capacity as DHS Secretary.
U.S. District Judge Randolph D. Moss held that venue was improper in the District of Columbia under Title VII's specific venue provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), and transferred the case to the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The court deferred all remaining arguments — including the government's timeliness and exhaustion challenges — for the transferee court to resolve.
The venue analysis turned on each of the four statutory prongs. On the first, the court pointed to the plaintiffs' own complaint, which alleged that promotion decisions are ultimately made by a small group of executive FAMS leaders at FAMS Headquarters — a facility located in Arlington or Springfield, Virginia throughout the relevant period, according to a declaration from a human resources officer. On the second prong, a declaration from the same officer established that relevant employment records are maintained and administered at TSA's headquarters in Springfield, Virginia. On the third, none of the named plaintiffs alleged duty stations or denied promotions tied to the District of Columbia; their duty stations and the positions they sought were spread across Georgia, Virginia, New York, Michigan, South Carolina, Illinois, Texas, Nevada, and other locations.
Plaintiffs argued that because this is a class action, it was reasonable to expect that at least some putative class members reside in the District given the proximity of TSA and FAMS headquarters in Northern Virginia. The court rejected that argument, citing the settled rule that venue for a putative class action is determined by looking only at the allegations pertaining to the named representatives, not the broader putative class.
The government's fallback argument — that DHS's principal office is in the District of Columbia — also failed. The court held that the fourth statutory prong, which permits suit where the respondent has its principal office, applies only if the respondent is not found within any other proper district. Because all parties agreed the Eastern District of Virginia was a proper venue, that fallback provision was inapplicable.
The government had urged the court to rule on its timeliness and exhaustion defenses before deciding whether to dismiss or transfer. Judge Moss declined, reasoning that a court with improper venue has no discretion to reach the merits once a venue objection has been properly raised, and that the better course was to transfer the case to the court empowered to adjudicate it.