The underlying dispute centers on U.S. Patent No. 8,769,440, titled "Method of Reactive Targeted Advertising." B.E. Technology accused Google of infringing the patent, which covers a method of transferring software to a user's computer to record computer usage information, assigning a unique identifier to that computer, and then selecting and delivering targeted advertisements based on that information. Only Claim 25 — which adds a requirement of providing reactive targeting of advertising to the user in real time by selecting and presenting an advertisement based at least in part on user interaction with the computer — remained in the case by the time the parties filed their summary judgment motions.
Judge Gregory B. Williams of the District of Delaware held at Alice Step One that Claim 25 is directed to the abstract idea of providing real-time targeted advertising based on information known about a user. The court drew on a line of Federal Circuit decisions — including Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank, Customedia Technologies LLC v. Dish Network Corp., Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon Communications, Inc., Free Stream Media Corp. v. Alphonso Inc., and Broadband iTV Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc. — each of which held that targeted advertising implemented on generic computer components is an abstract idea. The court analogized the claimed method to a salesperson tailoring a sales pitch to a particular customer in real time, and also quoted the Federal Circuit's observation in Intellectual Ventures that a television channel might choose to present a commercial for children's toys during early morning cartoon programs but beer during an evening sporting event.
The more consequential analysis came at Alice Step Two, where the court examined each claim element individually and as an ordered combination. On the "transferring" limitation — the step of sending software to the user's computer to display ads and record usage data — the court found the patent's own specification fatal to B.E.'s position. The specification described the electronic distribution of software as "widespread" and disclosed multiple prior-art systems, including the Dedrick Patent and the Pointcast product, that performed substantially similar functions. The court accepted B.E.'s expert declaration that the specification's disclosed embodiments may have offered unconventional methods, but concluded that those purported improvements were not reflected in the actual claim language and therefore could not supply an inventive concept.
On the "determining" and "selecting" limitations, B.E. argued that using a unique identifier to build a universal profile of all computer usage and pre-process advertisements was the inventive concept. The court disagreed, noting that the claim language requires only that the collected information include data from "one or more programs run on the computer" — not all usage information — making B.E.'s asserted inventive concept broader than what the claims actually required. The court applied the same reasoning to the "real time" limitation in Claim 25, noting that B.E. itself had stated that the concept of "real time," standing alone, was not an asserted inventive concept, and that using conventional computers to perform conventional steps faster does not supply an inventive concept.
The court also rejected B.E.'s argument that the ordered combination of all claim elements provided an inventive concept, finding that the combination amounted to nothing more than a restatement of the abstract idea itself.
With no valid asserted claim remaining, the court denied as moot Google's separate summary judgment motion on non-infringement based on prosecution disclaimer. The case is B.E. Technology, L.L.C. v. Google LLC, Civil Action No. 20-622-GBW (D. Del.).