The case involves Adrienne Lombardo, who applied for disability benefits based on major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. Her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Elizabeth Revell, opined that Lombardo’s impairments were totally disabling.
Instead of crediting Dr. Revell, the ALJ relied on opinions from two non-treating, non-examining state agency experts. The ALJ found both experts persuasive but conflated their differing conclusions without acknowledging the differences.
One expert, Dr. John Gavazzi, concluded that Lombardo could perform one- and two-step tasks. This limitation is a term of art in Social Security practice that connotes jobs limited to reasoning level one, the lowest reasoning level in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.
The ALJ fashioned a residual functional capacity that limited Lombardo to simple and routine tasks but omitted the one-to-two-step restriction. The ALJ then identified occupations such as routing clerk and mail sorter, which require reasoning levels two or three.
The court held that a limitation to simple tasks is not equivalent to a one-to-two-step limitation. The court noted that numerous courts have concluded that occupations requiring a reasoning level of two are not compatible with one-to-two-step task limitations.
The magistrate judge emphasized that when an ALJ finds a medical opinion persuasive, the ALJ is obligated to either incorporate that limitation into the RFC or explain the basis for discounting it. The ALJ’s failure to address this limitation deprived the decision of a complete logical bridge.
The court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the error was harmless. The court stated that it cannot re-weigh the evidence or impose its own factual determinations. Additionally, the court cannot substitute a different rationale for the ALJ’s decision. The case is remanded for further consideration by the Commissioner.