The case arises from a personal injury claim brought by Shawn Montgomery against Caribe Transport II and freight broker C.H. Robinson. At the center of the dispute is whether a state negligent-hiring tort — alleging that C.H. Robinson arranged transportation with a carrier it knew or should have known was unsafe — is saved from federal preemption by a statutory clause preserving state safety regulatory authority with respect to motor vehicles.
Paul D. Clement, arguing for Montgomery, told the Court that the whole point of the negligent-hiring tort is to keep dangerous motor vehicles off the road, and that the tort is no less directed at motor vehicles when brought against a broker than when brought against a carrier. He argued that, according to the allegations in the complaint, C.H. Robinson's own internal policy barred hiring carriers with conditional safety ratings, yet it allegedly did so in this case anyway. Clement also noted that roughly 94 percent of registered carriers have not had a meaningful federal safety inspection, making state tort law a critical backstop.
Theodore J. Boutrous Jr., arguing for C.H. Robinson and the other respondents, countered that brokers do not own, operate, or control motor vehicles, and that the savings clause — which uses the phrase with respect to motor vehicles — is, in the Court's prior words from Dan's City, massively limiting. He argued that Congress required only carriers, not brokers, to carry insurance against personal injury liability, and that the ICC itself stated in 1987 that brokers were not responsible for personal injury damages. Boutrous also told the Court that negligent-selection suits against federally licensed brokers did not begin until 2004, when the plaintiffs' bar began naming brokers as additional defendants.
Sopan Joshi, arguing for the United States as amicus supporting the respondents, focused on the statutory structure: the preemption clause uses with respect to the transportation of property in one paragraph and with respect to motor vehicles in the next, suggesting Congress made a conscious choice to parallel the language but narrow the noun. He acknowledged, however, that reading with respect to motor vehicles in isolation gave the petitioner a pretty good point.
Several justices pressed on a structural anomaly that neither side could fully explain: a separate subsection preempts state law claims against brokers for intrastate transportation with no safety savings clause at all, meaning broker tort suits would be preempted for intrastate trips but potentially preserved for interstate ones. Justice Alito said he came to argument hoping for a brilliant way of reconciling the two provisions and did not find one. Clement acknowledged the anomaly but argued it would exist regardless of how the Court ruled, and that the Court should not let the intrastate provision drive the interpretation of the interstate one.
Justice Kavanaugh pressed Clement on the practical consequences of a ruling for the petitioner, asking how brokers would assess driver drug and alcohol issues and English-language proficiency. Clement responded that brokers could protect themselves by hiring carriers that maintain adequate testing programs, and that the real problem is brokers who hire the cheapest carrier without asking any questions. Justice Sotomayor challenged Boutrous directly, noting that the FMCSA likely lacks the resources to adequately vet the six to nine thousand motor carriers that register each month, and asking why, given a savings clause using such a capacious word as with respect to, the Court should read it narrowly.