The case arose from a November 11, 2024 collision in San Diego. Aimee Bobo, driving a Ford F-450 truck southbound on Kearny Villa Road, ran a red light at an intersection with a Route 163 off-ramp and struck a Toyota Highlander driven by Mary Donato, who was turning left on a green light. Bobo and other witnesses estimated her speed at 55 to 60 miles per hour in a 50-mph zone; one witness estimated she was traveling up to 80 miles per hour. Donato was killed. Police saw no signs of intoxication, and Bobo, then 50 years old, had no prior criminal record.
Bobo was charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter under Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(2). Before trial, she sought diversion under section 1001.95, submitting character references, family photos, a request for an 18-month diversion period with specific conditions, and a detailed personal history. The trial court found her eligible — misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter is not among the offenses categorically excluded from the program — but ruled her unsuitable because her negligent conduct caused Donato's death. On reconsideration, the court acknowledged Bobo's character and community support but again denied diversion, stating that Donato was no longer alive solely because of Bobo's alleged actions. The appellate division of the superior court summarily denied Bobo's writ petition.
The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, granted the writ. The court held that the death of another person is a necessary element of misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter — any form of manslaughter requires the unlawful killing of a human being, and criminal negligence proximately causing death is inherent in the offense. Because the Legislature chose not to exclude misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter from section 1001.95, a trial court cannot deny diversion by pointing only to facts that define the crime itself. Doing so, the court held, is antithetical to the Legislature's deliberate inclusion of the offense in the diversion program. The court drew directly on Wade v. Superior Court and People v. K.D., both of which held that trial courts abused their discretion where they relied on the circumstances of charged offenses without linking them to the diversion statute's underlying purposes: treating, restoring, and rehabilitating defendants; reducing recidivism; promoting racial justice; preventing the collateral consequences of prosecution and incarceration; and decreasing the cost of traditional criminal proceedings while increasing accountability through rehabilitative programming.
The court also rejected the People's argument that the Donato family's opposition to diversion — and their desire to hear Bobo plead guilty — could independently support denial. The court held that the general findings and declarations in article I, section 28, subdivisions (a)(5) and (a)(6) of the California Constitution do not create enforceable rights, and that victim preferences cannot override controlling legislative diversion policy. The court noted that dismissal upon successful diversion completion, with no guilty plea or verdict, is precisely the scheme the Legislature chose, and courts are bound to honor it.
On the question of remedy, the court held that requiring Bobo to wait for an appeal after conviction would deprive her of the statute's intended benefits, force her through prosecution and potential incarceration, and waste resources that successful diversion would avoid. The court issued a peremptory writ directing the appellate division to vacate its summary denial, issue its own peremptory writ, and order the superior court to vacate its diversion denial and reconsider Bobo's suitability in conformity with the opinion. The case is Bobo v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court of San Diego County, docket D087393, decided April 22, 2026, and certified for publication.