Yulianny D. Aguilar-Linares, a 29-year-old Venezuelan national, entered the United States on August 31, 2022, seeking asylum. She had resided in Chicago and worked as a housekeeper since arriving in the United States, with no arrests or criminal history, when ICE detained her on March 1, 2026, at the Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport as she attempted to return home from a domestic trip to Puerto Rico. The government classified her as an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), a provision that carries no right to a bond hearing.
Magistrate Judge Giselle López-Soler, sitting in the District of Puerto Rico with the parties' consent, held that the government's classification was wrong. Because Aguilar-Linares had already been residing in the United States at the time of her arrest, her detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) — the provision covering noncitizens already present in the country who are arrested pending removal proceedings — not by § 1225(b)(2), which applies to arriving applicants for admission. The court adopted the reasoning of district courts across the First Circuit that accepting the government's broader reading of § 1225(b)(2) would render § 1226(a) effectively redundant, a result inconsistent with the statutory scheme.
The ruling aligns with a substantial body of district court decisions across the First Circuit. The opinion cited cases from the Districts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maine, New Hampshire, and Puerto Rico itself, all rejecting the government's position. The court also declined to follow Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), a recent Board of Immigration Appeals decision holding that all noncitizens who entered without admission are subject to § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention, noting that district courts are not bound by BIA interpretations that conflict with statutory text or controlling circuit precedent, a principle the court grounded in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).
Under First Circuit precedent, a noncitizen detained under § 1226(a) is entitled to a bond hearing at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee is dangerous, or by a preponderance of the evidence that she poses a flight risk. The court ordered respondents to hold that hearing within five days and to file an informative motion within two days of the hearing reporting whether bond was granted.
The court denied Aguilar-Linares's request for attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Although she prevailed, the court concluded it could not find that the government's position lacked substantial justification, pointing to the absence of settled First Circuit precedent on the question and noting that at least one court within the District of Puerto Rico had adopted the government's interpretation of § 1225.
The case is Aguilar-Linares v. Lyons et al., Civil No. 26-1122 (GLS), in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.