ICE Cannot Apply Mandatory-Detention Arrival Statute to Noncitizens Already Living in the U.S., Puerto Rico Magistrate Judge Rules

Yulianny D. Aguilar-Linares, a 29-year-old Venezuelan national, entered the United States on August 31, 2022, seeking asylum. She had been living in Chicago and working as a housekeeper, with no criminal history, when ICE arrested her on March 1, 2026, at the Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport as she attempted to return home from a domestic trip to Puerto Rico.

The government argued she was an "applicant for admission" subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which covers noncitizens seeking admission who are not clearly entitled to enter. Magistrate Judge Giselle López-Soler rejected that framing. Because Aguilar-Linares had already been residing in the United States for more than three years at the time of her arrest, her detention was governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which covers noncitizens already present in the country and requires a warrant and permits release on bond.

Detention under § 1225(b)(2) is mandatory and provides no bond hearing. Detention under § 1226(a) entitles the noncitizen to a hearing at which, under First Circuit precedent established in Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee is dangerous, or by a preponderance of the evidence that she poses a flight risk.

The court relied on a line of district court decisions holding that accepting the government's reading of § 1225(b)(2) would make § 1226(a) superfluous, because the government's interpretation would sweep in all noncitizens who entered without lawful admission regardless of how long they had been in the country. The opinion cited a substantial body of district court decisions across the First Circuit reaching the same conclusion, including cases from the District of Massachusetts, District of Rhode Island, District of Maine, District of New Hampshire, and multiple prior decisions within the District of Puerto Rico itself.

The court also declined to follow Matter of Yajure Hurtado, a 2025 Board of Immigration Appeals decision holding that all noncitizens who entered without admission are subject to § 1225(b)(2) and ineligible for bond. Citing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the court held it was not bound by BIA interpretations that conflict with statutory text or controlling circuit precedent.

The court denied Aguilar-Linares's request for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The court concluded that the government's position was not so lacking in justification as to warrant a fee award, primarily because there is no settled First Circuit appellate precedent resolving the statutory question, and additionally because at least one court within the district had adopted the government's statutory interpretation.

Respondents were ordered to provide Aguilar-Linares a bond hearing within five days and to file an informative motion within two days of that hearing reporting the outcome. The court retained jurisdiction to ensure compliance.