The case arose from the prosecution of Maxon Alsenat, who was indicted in the Southern District of Florida for knowingly possessing a machinegun conversion device — a device that meets the statutory definition of a machinegun under federal law. Alsenat stipulated that the government would have been able to prove he sold three such devices to an undercover law enforcement officer. After the district court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment, Alsenat pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He preserved his constitutional challenge for appeal.
Writing for the panel, Chief Judge William Pryor held that machineguns are not weapons in common use for lawful purposes and therefore fall outside Second Amendment protection under the framework established in District of Columbia v. Heller. The opinion drew on Heller's statement that it would be "startling" to conclude that federal restrictions on machineguns might be unconstitutional, and its recognition that weapons that are most useful in military service — M-16 rifles and the like — may be banned.
The court also surveyed the historical record, noting that handheld machineguns entered the civilian market after World War I and were quickly adopted by criminals, prompting at least 32 states to enact anti-machinegun laws between 1925 and 1934. Congress followed with the National Firearms Act in 1934 and enacted section 922(o) as part of the Firearm Owners' Protection Act in 1986. Today, the opinion noted, more than 35 jurisdictions strictly regulate machinegun possession, with at least 13 states and the District of Columbia banning all or nearly all such possession.
The panel held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi altered how Heller described the scope of the Second Amendment. Citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, the court noted that both decisions cited Heller for the proposition that the Second Amendment protects only weapons in common use and does not extend to those that are dangerous and unusual.
The Eleventh Circuit joined the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in expressly holding that the Second Amendment does not protect machinegun possession, and noted additional decisions from the First, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits pointing in the same direction.
Alsenat's argument that the ban was unconstitutional as applied to adult citizens with no felony convictions did not change the outcome. Because his challenge effectively reached beyond his individual circumstances to a defined subset of people covered by the statute, the panel treated it as a quasi-facial challenge — one that required him to show no set of circumstances exists under which section 922(o) is constitutional. Having concluded the statute is constitutional as applied to Alsenat, the court held his broader challenge failed as well.