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The D.C. Circuit granted a second writ of mandamus on April 14, terminating a district court's criminal contempt investigation into Trump administration officials over the transfer of suspected Tren de Aragua members to El Salvador. Writing for the court in docket 25-5452, Circuit Judge Neomi Rao held that the inquiry had outrun its legal basis and encroached on executive branch authority over foreign affairs.

The dispute traces back to March 14–15, 2025, when President Trump invoked the 1798 Alien Enemies Act against Tren de Aragua, a group the Secretary of State had designated a foreign terrorist organization the prior month. Trump determined the group was operating "at the direction" of Venezuelan authorities to "invade" and "conduct irregular warfare" against the United States. Two flights carrying suspected gang members departed for El Salvador the following day, before the district court issued a class-wide temporary restraining order barring further removals.

The written TRO enjoined the government from removing class members but said nothing about detainees already outside U.S. territory. Despite this, the district court found probable cause for criminal contempt, reading the TRO as a "clear and unequivocal" command that even already-landed detainees must not be discharged from U.S. custody and transferred to Salvadoran authorities.

The Supreme Court vacated the TRO on venue grounds, holding in *Trump v. J.G.G.*, 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1005–06 (2025), that the detainees' claims sounded in habeas and had to be brought in the district of confinement. The D.C. Circuit subsequently issued a first mandamus vacating the probable cause order in *J.G.G. v. Trump*, 147 F.4th 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2025).

The district court did not stand down. It expanded the inquiry by ordering declarations from all involved officials and scheduling additional hearings to extract information from government counsel. The court sought to determine whether then-Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem had acted "willfully" in authorizing the transfers, having previously represented that identifying the responsible official was the only remaining step before a referral for prosecution.

Rao quoted *Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C.*, 542 U.S. 367, 390 (2004), writing that "the widening gyre of the district court's investigation again calls for the extraordinary remedy of mandamus to halt the judicial 'impairment of another branch in the performance of its constitutional duties.'"

The majority held that the TRO lacked the clarity necessary to support criminal contempt charges based on the custody transfer. Furthermore, because the government had already provided Noem's name, Rao concluded that further judicial investigation was unnecessary and therefore improper.

Circuit Judge Walker concurred, focusing on the district court's assurance to counsel that a written order would memorialize all requirements. Walker read this language as making the written TRO controlling. Because that order covered only future removals, he concluded the government's conduct regarding already-departed detainees could not constitute contempt.

Circuit Judge Childs dissented, arguing that mandamus was inappropriate at the interlocutory stage.