The case centers on Munson P. Hunter III, who pleaded guilty to one count of fraud involving $32,000 — the only amount charged in the indictment — but was sentenced as though responsible for roughly a half-million dollars in fraud across uncharged conduct, according to the framing at argument. The sentencing court also imposed a supervised-release condition requiring Hunter to follow medical recommendations, including taking prescribed medication, even though, as his counsel told the Court, he had no mental health issues connected to the crime and the condition arose because a probation officer suggested medication might make supervision easier. The government does not defend that condition. Hunter's appeal waiver, the Fifth Circuit held, bars him from challenging it.
Lisa Blatt, arguing for Hunter, opened with a categorical claim: all contracts are subject to defenses, so appeal waivers — enforced under contract principles — must be too. She argued the Fifth Circuit's rule, which recognizes only two exceptions to appeal waivers (ineffective assistance of counsel and sentences above the statutory maximum), is indefensible, and that eleven other circuits have for decades applied contract defenses or a miscarriage-of-justice exception without producing a flood of litigation.
Justice Kagan pressed Blatt repeatedly to articulate a workable standard, asking what exactly counts as a contract defense in this context. Blatt proposed a two-part test: the error must be obvious and clear, and the sentence must be plainly unauthorized by statute or violate a constitutional right. Justice Gorsuch asked whether Blatt was essentially endorsing the Fourth Circuit's standard — a fundamental constitutional or statutory right firmly established at the time of sentencing — and Blatt said she liked that formulation, though she acknowledged she had not previously heard it stated that way. Justice Alito expressed comfort with a miscarriage-of-justice or shockingly improper standard but said extending the full law of contracts seemed open-ended, prompting Blatt to respond that the government itself routinely invokes contract law to enforce plea agreements and cannot claim a double standard.
Justice Jackson raised a more fundamental challenge: whether prospective waivers of sentencing errors are enforceable at all under knowing-and-voluntary principles, given that a defendant cannot know what errors a judge will make at a future sentencing. Blatt, responding to that line of questioning, noted that the Fourth Circuit, in a 2025 case called Smith cited by the Cato amicus brief, had taken that position — concluding such a waiver cannot be knowing and voluntary — while also applying a miscarriage-of-justice analysis. Blatt acknowledged she did not expect to win votes on that broader argument.
Zoe Jacoby, arguing for the government, took the front-line position that no contract defense applies to a knowing and voluntary appeal waiver based on the subsequent sentence received, and that the appeal waiver simply makes the district court the final decisionmaker on sentencing. Justice Gorsuch challenged that framing directly, asking whether a racist or sexist sentencing judge's decision would be unreviewable under the government's view; Jacoby said yes, the waiver would be enforceable. Chief Justice Roberts asked whether the government was comfortable defending all of Blatt's hypotheticals — castration, pregnancy restrictions, race-based sentences — and Jacoby maintained the front-line position that those waivers are enforceable, though she acknowledged a back-line position under which the Court could recognize a narrow miscarriage-of-justice exception. Justice Kavanaugh noted that the D.C. Circuit has long had a miscarriage-of-justice bullet on its list without the system falling apart. Jacoby's preferred fallback was a three-part test drawn from the Seventh Circuit: sentences explicitly based on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as race; sentences or conditions categorically unlawful for the offense of conviction; and sentences reached without even a minimum of civilized procedure.
Justice Barrett questioned whether the contract analogy truly supports the exceptions being discussed, noting that miscarriage of justice and statutory-maximum exceptions do not map cleanly onto contract doctrine, and suggesting that the Court's supervisory power over the district court — which must accept the plea — might provide a more honest doctrinal home. Jacoby said she could see that argument. The case is submitted.