AUSTIN (LN) — The Texas Supreme Court on Thursday ruled that two former Webb Consolidated Independent School District trustees who obtained a temporary injunction forcing the district to hand over meeting records are entitled to attorney's fees under Education Code Section 11.1512, even though both members' terms expired before the case reached final judgment.
Robert and Amy Marshall sued Webb Consolidated ISD in June 2020 after the district failed to respond to a May 16 request for information tied to six agenda items at an upcoming board meeting — including questions about a proposed elementary school construction project, a cash defeasance scenario, and the credentials of superintendent-recommended teachers.
On September 15, 2020, a trial court issued a temporary injunction ordering the district to produce four categories of documents within twenty days, including contractor payment records for five construction projects, construction management consultant information, teacher certification records, and administrator contract extensions. The district did not appeal.
Amy Marshall's term expired in November 2020. Robert Marshall's term ran out in November 2022 while the district's interlocutory appeal was pending. The district argued the entire case was moot and that the Marshalls, having never obtained a final judgment, could not qualify as prevailing parties entitled to fees.
Writing for the court, Justice Debra Lehrmann acknowledged the general rule — that a temporary injunction does not confer prevailing-party status because it does not conclusively resolve the merits — but held that Section 11.1512 presents an unusual statutory scheme that warrants a different result. The statute authorizes only one form of relief: an injunction compelling production of information. When the trial court ordered the district to turn over the documents and the district complied without appealing, the Marshalls received everything the statute allowed.
Lehrmann wrote that when a court orders a party to turn over requested information and the receiving party obtains knowledge of that information, there is no putting the genie back in the bottle.
The court drew on the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192 (2025), which held that a party prevails only when a court conclusively resolves his claim by granting enduring relief on the merits that alters the legal relationship between the parties. Lehrmann agreed with that framework but found the Section 11.1512 injunction satisfied it under the specific facts: the district complied, the information was disclosed, and no further substantive relief was available under the statute.
The court also rejected the district's argument that the Marshalls were required to exhaust administrative remedies by appealing to the Commissioner of Education before filing suit. Section 11.1512 uses the word suit rather than appeal, the court noted, and the Commissioner cannot order injunctive relief — making the administrative route structurally incompatible with a statute designed to get board members information within twenty business days. Routing disputes through the Commissioner, who has up to 240 days to issue a decision, would gut the statute's purpose, the court held.
The victory for the Marshalls is not unlimited. The court held that recoverable fees are limited to work performed in connection with the four document categories covered by the September 2020 injunction order — not the two additional years of litigation over subsequent requests that were mooted when the Marshalls left the board. The case returns to the trial court to calculate that narrower fee award.
Justice Hawkins filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Young and Sullivan.