The underlying dispute across all seven actions is the same basic problem: drinking water supplies contaminated by per- or polyfluoroalkyl substances, or PFAS. What divides these cases from the MDL's core docket is the alleged source. Each plaintiff expressly disavows any claim that AFFF — the firefighting foam at the center of MDL No. 2873 — caused its contamination. Fresno points to local metal stripping and electroplating firms. The Alabama plaintiffs blame carpet and textile manufacturing around Dalton, Georgia, and metal plating businesses in Alabama. Maine filed a separate non-AFFF action alongside its AFFF suit, limiting the non-AFFF complaint to 3M and DuPont as the principal manufacturers of PFAS and disclaiming any AFFF-related claims.
The panel's answer to all of them was the same: it does not matter that the plaintiffs' own complaints avoid AFFF allegations, so long as the water supplies at issue are already being litigated in the MDL. 3M identified personal injury plaintiffs already in the MDL who allege they drank water from each of these providers and that the water was contaminated by PFAS stemming from AFFF use or disposal. The panel held that overlap in the water supply — not overlap in the specific wells or contamination sources — is sufficient to justify transfer and the elimination of duplicative discovery.
The panel declined to create what plaintiffs called a de minimus exception for cases with only marginal AFFF overlap, and it refused to characterize the MDL personal injury complaints as conclusory — a label the plaintiffs urged — for failing to identify a particular contaminated water source rather than a contaminated water supplier. Doing so, the panel said, would require it to engage in a merits review of the complaints based on the amount of detail of plaintiffs' respective pre-suit investigations, something it has previously declined to do.
The City of Fresno presented a wrinkle: the City acknowledged that one well, Well 70, was contaminated by AFFF, but argued its claims were limited to 26 industrial locations unrelated to that well. The panel rejected that framing as inconsistent with the text of the complaint, which does not appear to be limited to specific wells but rather to specific defendants, and which seeks recovery for PFAS contamination of soil, water, and other City property in or around the City. Because the complaint is defendant-focused rather than well-focused, the panel held the City's claims necessarily encompass the known AFFF-contaminated well.
Maine's situation was the most procedurally complex. The State had filed parallel AFFF and non-AFFF actions in state court; the AFFF action was removed and transferred to the MDL without opposition, while the non-AFFF action bounced between state and federal court before the First Circuit reversed a remand order in Maine v. 3M Co., Inc., 159 F.4th 129 (1st Cir. 2025), holding that the State's disavowal of AFFF claims did not obviate the need for the trial court to determine whether any particular site was contaminated by AFFF use. After 3M's second removal, Maine began filing successive disclaimers of liability each time 3M identified an allegedly AFFF-contaminated site among the more than 900 sites Maine had identified in written discovery. The panel held that approach was not tenable, noting that the action must either proceed as part of the MDL or separate from it, and that the State's repetitive disclaimers and stated intent to continue disclaiming sites whenever AFFF is identified as a potential contamination source strongly suggest the action currently encompasses such sites.
The panel also rejected the Alabama plaintiffs' argument that transfer was premature because their actions are reportedly stayed pending the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Town of Pine Hill, Alabama v. 3M Company, No. 25-10746, which addresses a federal officer removal question common to all four Alabama cases. Pending remand motions, the panel held, are not an impediment to transfer and can be resolved by the transferee judge. The panel added that it does not concern itself with applicable circuit law when evaluating transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. All seven actions are now assigned to Judge Gergel for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.