SAN JUAN (LN) — A federal judge in Puerto Rico on Tuesday refused to dismiss a Title III ADA lawsuit brought by a wheelchair user against the operator of a Caguas pizzeria, rejecting the restaurant's arguments that the plaintiff lacked standing because she managed to eat there anyway, and ordering both sides to conduct a joint inspection of the premises by May 29.
Rayza Martinez Pomales, who alleges she is "absolutely dependent on a motorized wheelchair for mobility" due to degenerative spinal muscular atrophy, filed suit in October 2025 against Avro Corp., which operates Bambina pizzeria in Caguas. She alleged four categories of architectural barriers: a noncompliant entrance with steps and no ramp, obstructions and insufficient clearances at bar and dining counters, noncompliant restroom signage, and table designs that block wheelchair access.
Avro moved to dismiss in January, arguing Martinez lacked a concrete injury because she had eaten at the restaurant on multiple occasions with family and friends, and that the pizzeria was shielded from ADA liability by its status as a pre-1992 existing facility, its location in Caguas' historic district, and the fact that Avro leases rather than owns the building.
U.S. District Judge Raul M. Arias-Marxuach rejected all of those arguments. On standing, the court held that Martinez had plausibly alleged she was deterred from returning after staff had to help her surmount the entrance stairs — assistance the court said does not constitute equal access. "Title III's protections would ring hollow if any public accommodation could circumvent the ADA by instructing an employee to improvise a temporary alternative to equal access," Arias-Marxuach wrote.
On the merits, the court was equally unpersuaded by Avro's structural defenses. Title III expressly covers "any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation," the court noted, making Avro's lessee status irrelevant to its federal obligation. As for the historic-district argument, the court held that Avro had done no more than note that board approval might be required for certain alterations — far short of demonstrating that the requested relief was not feasible, particularly given that several alleged barriers involve furniture, signage, and operational arrangements rather than changes to the building's facade.
The pre-1992 facility argument fared no better. The court acknowledged that older buildings face a "readily achievable" standard rather than the stricter requirements imposed on new construction, but held that standard cuts against Avro at the pleading stage, not for it. Drawing on "judicial experience and common sense" — a standard applied in this district — the court held that barriers involving movable furniture and signage plausibly could be removed without much difficulty or expense, and that discovery may reveal evidence of Avro's financial capacity to do more.
Rather than simply denying the motion and opening discovery, Arias-Marxuach ordered the parties to meet at the pizzeria by May 29, 2026, to conduct a joint inspection of all four barrier categories. Avro may undertake corrective action on the spot if it is easily achievable. After the inspection, Avro has 21 days to file a summary judgment motion; the plaintiff then has 21 days to oppose and may cross-move for summary judgment; Avro has 7 days to reply; and Martinez may file a surreply within 7 days of that reply.
Martinez lives four minutes by car from the pizzeria, according to her complaint — a proximity that, under the First Circuit's deterrence standard, helped establish the real and immediate threat of future harm her standing required.