The case involves Ali Danial Hemani, who was prosecuted under the "unlawful user" prong of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3) based on evidence that he used marijuana approximately every other day. The government, represented by Principal Deputy Solicitor General Sarah M. Harris, argued that the restriction fits within a historical tradition of disarming habitual drunkards and that illegal drug use is meaningfully different from alcohol consumption because of its illegality, the Controlled Substances Act scheduling process, and post-ratification history of states treating habitual illegal drug users as a dangerous class. Hemani was represented by Erin E. Murphy, who argued that the historical habitual drunkard laws targeted people whose consumption was so excessive it impaired their ability to function even in whatever moments of sobriety they may have had — a far higher bar than using marijuana a few times a week.
Several justices pressed Harris hard on the breadth of the government's position. Justice Gorsuch noted that the record showed only that Hemani used marijuana about every other day in an unknown quantity, and asked whether someone who took one gummy bear every other night with a medical prescription would be subject to disarmament under the government's theory. Harris confirmed that would be covered, pointing to the knowledge requirement under Rehaif as a limiting principle. Justice Gorsuch also observed that it was an odd case to have chosen to test the principle given that the government itself is considering rescheduling marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule III.
Justice Barrett focused on whether the Controlled Substances Act scheduling process actually reflects a congressional judgment about dangerousness in the firearms context. She noted that proclivity to violence is not among the statutory criteria for placing a drug on a schedule, and asked whether the government's position would extend to habitual unlawful users of Ambien, Adderall, Robitussin, and similar substances. Harris acknowledged that violence is not an express scheduling criterion but argued the scheduling process serves as an adequate proxy for dangerousness. Justice Barrett was not satisfied, pressing that the statute's connection to danger was too attenuated when the same drug — Ambien, for example — could be taken lawfully by one spouse and unlawfully by another, with no difference in the pharmacological risk.
Justice Jackson raised a structural concern about the Bruen framework itself, arguing that the government's position effectively asks the Court to credit Congress's modern legislative judgment about who is dangerous, which she said is precisely what the Bruen test prohibits. She questioned whether the government's identified historical principle — that habitual intoxicant users can be restricted — was specific enough to do any constraining work, given that founding-era standards for habitual drunkards required a level of incapacitation far beyond using marijuana every other day.
Murphy, for Hemani, argued that the government had made a category mistake: the habitual drunkard laws applied only to habitual drunkards, not to habitual drinkers, and the whole point of the doctrine was to distinguish those who consumed alcohol frequently but mostly in moderation from those whose consumption impaired their ability to function even in moments of sobriety. She said the tradition may support disarming people addicted to controlled substances, and conceded that some substances — Justice Barrett suggested cocaine and methamphetamine, and Murphy agreed — might support categorical prohibitions, but argued marijuana does not, given that 40 states, the District of Columbia, three territories, and the President have concluded it is not categorically dangerous. Murphy also flagged an independent vagueness problem with the "unlawful user" prong, noting that only eight states have such a prong and that early drug laws from the 1920s and 1930s contained no unlawful-user provision at all.
Justice Kavanaugh explored whether the two prongs of 922(g)(3) — unlawful user and addicted — effectively merge once the government reads "unlawful user" to require habitual use, since the Controlled Substances Act defines an addict as someone who habitually uses a narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare. Both advocates acknowledged the definitions overlap but disputed whether they collapse entirely. In rebuttal, Harris warned that Murphy's approach would require individualized mini-trials in every 922(g)(3) prosecution and would destabilize the entire 922(g) framework, including the felon-in-possession and fugitive provisions.