According to the complaint, Justin Secrest was working as a foreman for Harris Mountain West, LLC, a mechanical contractor, at a job site where Turner Construction Company provided construction services. On August 8, 2024, Secrest allegedly suffered a pinched nerve and a sports hernia while moving a heavy air unit. His medical providers placed him on a light-duty restriction that substantially limited his ability to bend, lift, or carry objects. After Secrest requested a light-duty accommodation, both defendants initially approved it — then placed him on unpaid leave and banned him from the work location within days. By August 30, 2024, Secrest's supervisor notified him by phone that he was terminated for refusing a drug test. When Secrest responded that he had never been asked to take one, his supervisor explained that he was not aware of the details, but that defendants had instructed him to terminate Secrest.
Secrest filed suit in Hamilton County, Ohio Common Pleas Court, asserting claims against Turner Construction for disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate under Ohio Revised Code § 4112. Harris Mountain — with the consent of Turner Construction — removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds in April 2025. Turner Construction moved to dismiss, arguing it was not Secrest's employer and that the complaint failed to adequately allege a joint-employer relationship.
Judge Matthew W. McFarland denied the motion. Applying the standard drawn from Sixth Circuit precedent — whether one employer, while contracting in good faith with an otherwise independent company, has retained sufficient control of the terms and conditions of employment of the employees who are employed by the other employer, including the ability to hire, fire, and discipline, affect compensation and benefits, and direct and supervise performance — the court held that Secrest's allegations were sufficient at the pleading stage.
The key allegation was that the defendants, collectively, instructed Secrest's supervisor to terminate him. Turner Construction countered in its reply brief that it had no involvement in Harris Mountain's decision to end Secrest's employment, but Judge McFarland held that this assertion directly contradicted the complaint's allegations and could not be resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The court also declined to consider factual assertions Turner Construction offered outside the four corners of the complaint.
The court further rejected Turner Construction's argument that more detailed allegations of control were required at the pleading stage, citing sister-court decisions within the Sixth Circuit holding that plaintiffs need not plead specific details about defendants' employment arrangements to survive dismissal. The court noted that the extent of a defendant's control is a fact-specific inquiry better addressed after discovery.