Zachary Thomas Scruggs sued Cheatham County and county deputy sheriff Ryan Creech under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Creech used excessive force to arrest him without probable cause following a vehicle accident. The criminal charges against Scruggs were dismissed. Scruggs alleged that Creech's conduct was captured on video in the county's possession, that it was known within the department that Creech was prone to behavioral outbursts or reckless conduct, and that the county had notice of prior incidents — one involving guns being fired into a residence and one involving the deployment of a taser — that demonstrated a history of inadequate training and improper use of force.
Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr. of the Middle District of Tennessee granted Cheatham County's Rule 12(b)(6) motion in full. The court analyzed all four recognized theories of Monell liability under Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2013) — official policy, final-policymaker ratification, failure to train or supervise, and custom of tolerance — and held that Scruggs failed to plausibly allege any of them.
On the official-policy theory, the court held that Scruggs's allegation that the county maintained a custom, pattern, and practice of condoning improper use-of-force policies was a legal conclusion masquerading as a factual allegation, citing Vittetoe v. Blount Cnty., Tennessee, 861 F. App'x 843 (6th Cir. 2021). On ratification, the court held that the county's continued employment of Creech after the incident and its possession of the video did not alone suggest that any final policymaker approved or adopted Creech's conduct.
The failure-to-train theory received the most extended treatment. The court held that Scruggs failed to connect any specific training deficiency to the incident and had not alleged a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees, as required by Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011). The court contrasted Scruggs's pleading with cases he cited in his brief — Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2016), where training materials directing officers to aim for almost the entire body of a suspect rather than avoiding the chest to reduce the risk of fatal injury were found sufficient to satisfy the elements of inadequate training, and Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1992), where an expert opined on detailed training inadequacies raising genuine issues of material fact.
On the custom theory, the court addressed Scruggs's argument directly. Scruggs had asked in his brief whether a pattern requires two, three, or four incidents. The court answered by citing Beard v. Whitmore Lake School District, 244 F. App'x 607 (6th Cir. 2007), which held that two incidents do not, as a matter of law, establish a widespread pattern of constitutional violations. The court added that two incidents — one related to firearms and one related to tasers — do not demonstrate a widespread pattern where the alleged conduct at issue is strangulation.
The ruling illustrates the pleading burden plaintiffs face when pursuing Monell claims in the Sixth Circuit: generalized assertions about officer conduct, a handful of prior incidents in different categories of force, and continued employment of the accused officer are insufficient without specific factual allegations tying a county policy or pattern directly to the constitutional violation alleged.