Key Points

  • U.S. District Judge Emily C. Marks denied eight Alabama death row inmates' motion for summary judgment on their facial Eighth Amendment challenges to the state's nitrogen hypoxia protocol, and denied their construed motion for oral argument.
  • Marks held that the court's June 9, 2026, declaration in Lee v. Lovelace that the protocol is facially unconstitutional is not dispositive because it rested on an assumption, made on an underdeveloped record, that air hunger stays constant until an inmate loses consciousness.
  • The court held that the 11th Circuit's unpublished Lee decision is not binding precedent and does not support summary judgment for the inmates.
  • Relying on United States v. Mendoza, Hercules Carriers and Demaree, the court held that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel may not be applied against the Alabama Department of Corrections in this case.
  • Wilson's motion for leave to amend the complaint to add the firing squad as an alternative method of execution will be resolved by separate order.

A federal judge in Alabama on Nov. 19 refused to grant judgment to eight death row inmates challenging the state's nitrogen hypoxia execution protocol on the strength of the court's own June ruling declaring the protocol facially unconstitutional, concluding that the earlier decision rested on a critical fact the court had assumed, rather than found, on an underdeveloped record.

U.S. District Judge Emily C. Marks of the Middle District of Alabama denied the inmates' motion for summary judgment and their request for oral argument. Marks also held that the inmates cannot invoke collateral estoppel, writing that "nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel may not be applied against the ADOC, a state agency, in this case."

The ruling means the June decision, which permanently barred the state from executing inmate Jeffery Lee using the protocol, does not resolve the claims of the eight remaining challengers. According to the order, the Alabama Department of Corrections has not changed the protocol since that decision and intends to carry out the plaintiffs' executions using it.

The plaintiffs are David Wilson, Kim Van Pelt, Rick Belisle, Jimmy Brooks Jr., Larry George, Mark Jenkins, Marcus Williams and Jarrod Taylor. Each claims under 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983 that the protocol facially violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. A facial challenge, the order explains, is "a claim that the law or policy at issue is unconstitutional in all its applications." The defendants are Greg Lovelace, commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, and Terry Raybon, warden of Holman Correctional Facility.

Lee's case was split off from the others and tried on an expedited schedule after the state announced plans to set an execution date. Following an April 2026 bench trial, Marks found that the protocol causes one to three minutes of severe air hunger but concluded that Lee had not shown an Eighth Amendment violation. In a footnote, the court "assume[d] without deciding that the level of air hunger" stayed constant once the nitrogen began to flow.

The 11th Circuit, in an unpublished decision, held that the effects Marks described, "which last[] for one to three minutes, present[] a substantial risk of serious harm over and above death itself," and sent the case back on Lee's proposed alternative, the firing squad. On remand, Marks found the firing squad feasible, declared the protocol facially unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the state from executing Lee using the protocol. The 11th Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to halt the injunction, the parties stipulated to dismissal of the state's appeal, and Lee was executed by lethal injection on Sept. 17, according to the order.

The eight inmates argued that the declaration in Lee applies to everyone subject to the protocol and that stare decisis and judicial economy supported judgment in their favor. They also argued the state was estopped from relitigating the protocol's constitutionality. The state countered that neither the June ruling nor the 11th Circuit's decision entitled the plaintiffs to judgment.

Marks agreed with the state. The order says that under stare decisis the court is not bound by its decision in Lee and may "depart from one of its own prior holdings if a compelling reason to do so exists," and that the 11th Circuit's unpublished decision is not binding precedent. "A compelling reason to depart from Lee III exists here," Marks wrote, using the order's name for the June ruling.

Marks wrote that in the Lee litigation "the record was underdeveloped on the critical issue of whether air hunger remains constant or fluctuates until an inmate loses consciousness." The 11th Circuit did not address that assumption, and the court did not revisit it on remand, the order says. As a result, Marks wrote, "the Court in its discretion concludes that Lee III is not dispositive of the Plaintiffs' claims at this juncture."

The order cautions that a fuller record will not necessarily favor the state. "The Court does not suggest that a more fully developed record would necessarily mean that the fact would be resolved in the State's favor," Marks wrote in a footnote. Another footnote says that had the state won in Lee and sought summary judgment here, the court would similarly have concluded that Lee "did not compel the grant of summary judgment in the State's favor."

On estoppel, Marks relied on the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in United States v. Mendoza, which held that nonmutual collateral estoppel, invoked by someone who was not a party to the earlier case, cannot be used against the federal government. The justices reasoned that such a rule "would substantially thwart the development of important questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue." The 11th Circuit extended that reasoning to states in Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant State of Florida, Department of Transportation, and to a Georgia school district in Demaree v. Fulton County School District.

Applying those cases, Marks noted that "the ADOC chose not to pursue an appeal of this Court's final judgment in Lee III," and that the case involves an important constitutional issue. Estopping the department after the first merits trial, especially given the assumed fact, "would hinder the [C]ourt from developing and clarifying essential constitutional law," Marks wrote, quoting Demaree. "The fact that this case and Lee III both involve the same state agency is not a sufficient basis for this Court to depart from Eleventh Circuit precedent in this area," the order says.

Tamryn D. Holley of Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP represented plaintiff David P. Wilson. Brenton Leigh Thompson of the Office of The Attorney General - Alabama represented defendant John Q. Hamm. Hamm was the department's commissioner when the cases were filed, and Lovelace was substituted for him as a defendant after Hamm retired, the order says.

The inmates' facial Eighth Amendment claims remain pending, as does Wilson's separate claim that the protocol violates the international law norm against torture. Five plaintiffs have pleaded the firing squad as an alternative method of execution; George has identified lethal injection, Brooks two modified nitrogen protocols and Wilson a medical-aid-in-dying drug combination. Wilson's motion to amend to add the firing squad will be resolved by separate order, Marks wrote. Before Wilson's case joined the others, the cases filed in August 2025 were set for a bench trial on June 28, 2027.