Key Points
- The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the denial of arbitration for 112 Robinson Nursing and Rehabilitation Center residents, holding their agreements procedurally unconscionable under the totality of the circumstances.
- The court relied on Robinson's making arbitration a condition of admission for most residents while defending a certified class action over its care of residents, and on its failure to disclose that litigation to incoming residents.
- The court said it imposed no special disclosure rule on arbitration agreements and no duty to disclose every pending lawsuit, and that the Federal Arbitration Act preserves unconscionability as a defense.
- The court reversed the denials for three residents because the circuit court exceeded the 2023 mandate, and dismissed the class's cross-appeal because orders compelling arbitration are not immediately appealable.
- Justice Bronni, joined by Justice Hiland, dissented, arguing the ruling singles out arbitration in violation of the Federal Arbitration Act.
The Arkansas Supreme Court on Nov. 19 affirmed orders denying arbitration for 112 residents of Robinson Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, holding that the facility made arbitration a condition of admission for most of them while it was defending a certified class action over its care of residents and did not tell them about that lawsuit.
Justice Shawn A. Womack wrote for a 3-2 majority that included Special Justices Brian Lester and Cory Cox. "Considered together, the circumstances surrounding these agreements establish procedural unconscionability," Womack wrote, using the term for unfairness in how a contract is formed, which under Arkansas law turns on "whether a party had a meaningful choice in accepting the agreement." Justices Hiland and Nicholas J. Bronni dissented, and Justices Wood and Webb did not participate.
The decision means Robinson cannot compel arbitration under those 112 agreements, in the sixth appeal of a class action that began in 2014. But the court said it was not creating a new rule. In a footnote, Womack wrote that the court imposed "no special disclosure requirement on arbitration agreements" and did not hold that contracting parties "must disclose every pending lawsuit."
Andrew Phillips, as personal representative of the estate of Dorothy Phillips, filed the operative class complaint in September 2015, alleging that Robinson chronically understaffed its nursing facility. The Pulaski County Circuit Court certified a class in March 2016 covering all residents and estates of residents of the facility from June 11, 2010, onward. In 2017 the Supreme Court affirmed certification of the contract, deceptive-trade-practices and unjust-enrichment claims but not the negligence claim.
The current appeal involves residents admitted after the class action began. After three remands for more specific findings and reassignment to Judge Cara Boyd Connors, the circuit court in April 2025 granted arbitration for 112 of them and denied it for 115, citing defects such as signatories' lack of authority. It rejected Phillips' argument that the agreements were unconscionable.
The Supreme Court affirmed most of the denials on that alternative ground. Womack pointed first to timing: Robinson obtained the agreements from residents admitted between June 2017 and May 2021, after the class was certified and the certification affirmed. Most of the agreements stated that "[s]igning this Arbitration Agreement, as a part of the Admission Agreement, is a condition of admission."
"Although they could seek care elsewhere, they could not obtain care from Robinson without accepting arbitration," Womack wrote. That distinguished the court's 2016 decision in GGNSC Holdings v. Lamb, which rejected an unconscionability challenge to a nursing-home agreement that expressly said arbitration was not a condition of admission. The court also cited a 2019 federal regulation barring participating facilities from conditioning admission on arbitration, which it said does not itself make the agreements unenforceable but bears on whether residents had a meaningful choice.
The court said the disparity in bargaining power "was compounded by a disparity in information." Robinson's admissions coordinator, Kelli Howard, testified to knowing about the lawsuit around 2015. Asked whether she told residents of their potential representation in it, Howard answered, "Oh, no, I don't discuss the lawsuit." "That omission is fatal," Womack wrote.
Robinson had argued that the agreements expressly disclosed the waiver of a judicial forum and that notifying class members was class counsel's job. The court answered that prospective residents could not be identified as class members until they were admitted, by which time they had already been presented with the agreements. It also said the agreements' warning, printed in capital letters, did not close the gap. "The residents could comprehend the general waiver of a judicial forum without knowing that Robinson was already defending a certified class action involving claims arising from its care," Womack wrote.
Womack wrote that the Federal Arbitration Act, which requires that arbitration agreements be placed on the same footing as other contracts, expressly preserves defenses such as unconscionability. The holding did not rest on the loss of class procedures, the court said; what made the pending suit significant was "Robinson's superior knowledge of an existing controversy against which it sought to enforce the agreements." Responding to the dissent, Womack wrote, "The FAA requires no more—and permits no less."
In a footnote citing the "repeated remands in this decade-old litigation," the court partly overruled its 2014 decision in Bank of the Ozarks v. Walker, holding that circuit courts need not decide whether an arbitration agreement was formed when a defense would defeat it regardless.
The court reversed the denials for three residents, Dorothy Jackson, Johnnie Jones and Mona Rea, holding that the circuit court exceeded the Supreme Court's 2023 mandate by revisiting earlier orders sending them to arbitration. And it dismissed Phillips' cross-appeal of the order compelling arbitration for 112 residents, because Arkansas law allows an immediate appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration "but not from an order granting one."
Bronni opened the dissent with the line "Well, it's Groundhog Day . . . again," and wrote that the majority "finds yet another way to undermine freedom of contract, extend this case, and violate the Federal Arbitration Act." Bronni argued that the majority's reasons were "all specific to arbitration—or at least specific to nursing home arbitration," and that faulting Robinson for not disclosing the lawsuit imposed a "special notice requirement" of the kind the U.S. Supreme Court has barred.
"I'd enforce all the arbitration agreements at issue and end this case once and for all," Bronni wrote, joined by Hiland. "Anything less just sets up yet another appeal—and ultimately reversal on federal law grounds."
Kynda Almefty of Hardin, Jesson & Terry, PLLC (Little Rock) represented the appellant. H. Gregory Campbell of Campbell Law Firm, P.A. represented the appellee.
The case returns to the Pulaski County Circuit Court. The earlier orders sending Jackson, Jones and Rea to arbitration remain in effect, and the grants of arbitration for 112 residents stand without appellate review at this stage, because the court dismissed the cross-appeal without reaching their merits.