Key Points

  • Judge Douglas Harpool denied AstraZeneca's motion for summary judgment and granted the motions of the Missouri defendants and the two intervening associations, entering judgment for them.
  • The court held that SB 751 adds obligations to AstraZeneca's Pharmaceutical Pricing Agreement but does not substantially impair it, because contracting in a heavily regulated industry put the company on notice and the law conflicts with no term of the agreement.
  • The court held that a reduction in profits is not alone proof of substantial impairment and joined the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in AbbVie Inc. v. Murrill on Louisiana's similar law.
  • In the alternative, the court held that SB 751 serves a significant and legitimate public purpose even if covered entities and contract pharmacies are its main beneficiaries.

A federal judge in Missouri has ruled that a state law forcing drugmakers to deliver discounted 340B drugs to every outside pharmacy a qualifying provider contracts with does not violate the Constitution's Contracts Clause, holding that the law reduces AstraZeneca's profits without substantially impairing its pricing agreement with the federal government. The Contracts Clause bars states from passing any law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts."

U.S. District Judge Douglas Harpool of the Western District of Missouri on Nov. 19 denied AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP's motion for summary judgment. He granted the competing motions of the state defendants, including Missouri Attorney General Catherine Hanaway, and of two intervenors, the Missouri Hospital Association and the Missouri Primary Care Association, and entered judgment in their favor.

The ruling disposes of the only claim the court had allowed to proceed against SB 751, Missouri's 2024 contract-pharmacy law. It also aligns the court with the Fifth Circuit's decision in AbbVie Inc. v. Murrill on Louisiana's version of the law. "This Court now joins in endorsing a premise underlying Murrill: state laws like SB 751 do not substantially impair PPAs, for such laws do not affect pharmaceutical manufacturers' obligations in ways other than reducing those manufacturers' profits," Harpool wrote.

Section 340B of the Public Health Service Act requires drug manufacturers participating in federal drug reimbursement markets to offer outpatient drugs at a discount to certain health care providers, known as covered entities. A manufacturer joins by signing a Pharmaceutical Pricing Agreement, or PPA, with the Department of Health and Human Services; the order says its terms mirror the federal law. Discounted prices run "sometimes for as little as a penny per sale," and covered entities need not pass the savings to patients, the order says.

Federal guidance let covered entities without an in-house pharmacy use a single contract pharmacy starting in 1996 and let covered entities use an unlimited number starting in 2010, the order recounts. After manufacturers began restricting those arrangements in 2020, HHS issued an advisory opinion requiring delivery to unlimited contract pharmacies, and manufacturers sued. The Third Circuit held that Section 340B does not require manufacturers to recognize an unlimited number of contract pharmacies, and the D.C. Circuit held that the statute preserves sellers' ability to impose at least some delivery conditions. Missouri's SB 751 then barred manufacturers from denying, restricting or prohibiting delivery of 340B drugs to a covered entity's contract pharmacies, which conflicts with AstraZeneca's policy of shipping only to an in-house pharmacy or one designated contract pharmacy.

AstraZeneca sued, claiming the law was preempted by federal patent and drug exclusivity laws and by the 340B scheme, and that it violated the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause. The court earlier dismissed the preemption and takings claims but kept the Contracts Clause claim, finding that "Plaintiff ha[d] sufficiently alleged the existence of a contract, that would be substantially impaired by S.B. 751." The company sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

At summary judgment, Harpool agreed with AstraZeneca that SB 751 adds obligations to its PPA, even though the agreement says nothing about delivery. "The entire point, after all, of laws like SB 751 is to affect what pharmaceutical manufacturers can and cannot do pursuant to the 340B program," he wrote. But he held that the added obligations did not amount to substantial impairment, the threshold question under the clause.

Harpool relied on Eighth Circuit precedent holding that parties in heavily regulated industries are on notice of future regulation, and he noted that regulating pharmacy is part of a state's police power. AstraZeneca argued that the relevant field was narrower, because states had never regulated the pricing or delivery of 340B drugs. The order notes that the Eighth Circuit, in other contexts, has found Contracts Clause violations even in heavily regulated industries, including insurance and housing.

"The record does not support that distinction," Harpool wrote. Contract pharmacies did not exist under the program when AstraZeneca signed its PPA in 1993, he wrote, but they have coexisted with it since 1996, and "the history of covered entities contracting first with a single and then with unlimited outside pharmacies over the past twenty years suggests that state regulation over such contracting was foreseeable."

He also distinguished the cases AstraZeneca cited, in which state laws dramatically altered contracting parties' obligations. "That is far from the outlook here, where SB 751 does not conflict with a single term of AstraZeneca's PPA," he wrote. Turning to Murrill, he concluded: "Reduction in profits is not alone appropriate proof for substantial impairment of a contract; that is often the effect of state laws in regulated industries."

Harpool held in the alternative that the law would survive even if it substantially impaired the contract, because it serves a significant and legitimate public purpose. AstraZeneca had argued that a law meant mainly to help covered entities and pharmacies, rather than patients, provides "a benefit to special interests" instead of the "broad and general" benefit the test requires. Citing Supreme Court precedent on deference to legislative judgment, Harpool wrote that AstraZeneca "must do more than note that covered entities and contract pharmacies may be the main entities whose interests benefit from SB 751 while AstraZeneca's interests suffer."

He wrote that "SB 751's savings for covered entities and contract pharmacies allow those entities to provide better overall service to patients," and he quoted record material stating that "Missouri is a very rural state" and that a single contract pharmacy "makes it harder for patients to access their 340B drugs." In a footnote, he rejected AstraZeneca's argument that deference was inappropriate because Missouri runs some covered entities, noting that the law also benefits private providers and pharmacies.

"Even were SB 751 to provide no direct savings to patients (an assumption not established by the record) the Missouri legislature has a prerogative, under its police power, of supporting local health providers," Harpool wrote.

The order's background section states that the two intervening associations developed the text of SB 751 and that its contract-pharmacy language "would generate revenue for MPCA and MHA's members at the expense of pharmaceutical manufacturers."

Lora Jennings Mizell of Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Bauer LLP represented AstraZeneca. Ronald S. Connelly represented the Missouri Hospital Association.

With the preemption and takings claims already dismissed, the order enters summary judgment for the defendants and intervenors on AstraZeneca's remaining claim. The case is No. 2:24-cv-04143 in the Western District of Missouri.