Key Points

  • U.S. District Judge Vernon D. Oliver overruled Conservation Law Foundation's objections and affirmed in all respects Magistrate Judge Thomas O. Farrish's May 18, 2026, order granting the defendants' motion to compel AI reliance materials.
  • Oliver concluded that AI prompts and queries used by expert Naomi Oreskes or her team in producing her report are discoverable under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i) because they comprise the basis for her opinions, and that the process she used to cull the defendants' production is within the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b).
  • Oliver found no error in Farrish's conclusion that the parties' Rule 29 stipulation shielding expert drafts and notes, which does not mention artificial intelligence, did not clearly exclude the prompts.
  • Sworn testimony from Oreskes and her assistant Alexander Kaurov was solid evidence that the prompts existed at one time, warranting an order of production despite counsel's representation that the materials do not exist.
  • Oliver lifted his stay and directed the foundation to comply with Farrish's order by Dec. 18, 2026.

A federal judge in Connecticut has ordered the Conservation Law Foundation to disclose the artificial intelligence prompts and queries its expert witness and her research assistant used to search the defendants' documents, concluding that the prompts comprise "the basis" for the expert's opinions under the federal rule governing expert reports.

U.S. District Judge Vernon D. Oliver on Nov. 20 overruled the foundation's objections and affirmed "in all respects" a May 18 order by U.S. Magistrate Judge Thomas O. Farrish that granted the defendants' motion to compel. The defendants are Equilon Enterprises LLC, which does business as Shell Oil Products US, Triton Terminaling LLC and Motiva Enterprises LLC. Oliver lifted his stay of that order and directed the foundation to comply by Dec. 18.

The ruling requires the foundation to revise its discovery responses to disclose any AI prompts and queries used by Harvard University history of science professor Naomi Oreskes or her team in producing her expert report. Oliver also upheld Farrish's conclusions that the parties' agreement shielding expert drafts and notes did not clearly reach the prompts, and that sworn testimony gave reason to doubt counsel's representation that the materials never existed.

The foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to protecting New England's public health, environment and natural resources, filed the case in July 2021 as a citizen enforcement action under the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, known as RCRA. It alleges unlawful conduct at a bulk storage and fuel terminal in New Haven. One RCRA claim and 11 Clean Water Act claims remain pending.

According to the order, Oreskes relied on materials produced in the litigation in writing her opening report and brought on Alexander A. Kaurov, a computational scientist, as a research assistant. Kaurov processed the documents in a dedicated Microsoft Azure cloud environment created solely for the project and used ChatGPT to search for documents and identify those for Oreskes to review. "We used the ChatGPT to identify the documents," Oreskes testified at her deposition. Kaurov did not preserve complete native "prompt/output log" standalone files, the order says.

The defendants moved to compel on Dec. 23, 2025. They argued that the foundation violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), which requires a retained expert to provide a signed written report, by refusing to produce the facts, data and documents underlying Oreskes's AI methodology. They said Oreskes and Kaurov jointly developed the prompts used to analyze the defendants' production. After conferring at Farrish's direction, the parties narrowed their dispute to the request for the prompts and outputs, and Farrish granted the motion after a May 14 hearing. Oliver heard oral argument on the foundation's objections on Nov. 3.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), a district judge may set aside a magistrate judge's discovery order only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

Oliver held that the prompts fall under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i), which requires an expert's report to contain a complete statement of the expert's opinions and "the basis and reasons for them." "Plaintiff must disclose artificial intelligence prompts and queries used by Dr. Oreskes or her team in the course of producing her expert witness report," he wrote.

He pointed to Oreskes's deposition testimony that she used "AI as a sieve to identify all the documents that could be relevant to a particular question," such as all documents that mention sea level rise. Oreskes testified that she and Kaurov discussed what the prompts would be, that he ran the analysis, and that she then reviewed the documents. "Thus, it appears that the prompts and queries comprise the basis for Dr. Oreskes's opinions," Oliver wrote.

Oliver reached the same result under Rule 26(b), which permits discovery of nonprivileged matter relevant to a claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. He concluded that "the process by which Dr. Oreskes culled down the defendants' document production into a subset to be worked with falls within the scope of discovery."

The foundation also argued that Farrish misread a stipulation the parties entered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 29(b). The stipulation bars discovery of drafts of expert reports and of certain communications on expert opinions, "including emails, notes, and other correspondence." Oliver found no abuse of discretion in Farrish's conclusion that the agreement did not clearly exclude the prompts, "where the agreement does not even mention the use of artificial intelligence."

Oliver quoted ChatGPT's official website, which states that "[p]rompting is how you tell ChatGPT what you want to know, make, or change." Against that backdrop, he wrote, it was not clearly erroneous for Farrish to conclude that AI prompts are distinguishable from an expert's notes.

Oliver likewise rejected the argument that Farrish compelled production of materials that, according to counsel's representations, do not exist. He wrote that Farrish correctly acknowledged that courts generally should deny a motion to compel when a party avers in good faith that the items sought do not exist. But he wrote that Kaurov's declaration, which referred to prompts, and Oreskes's testimony "comprise 'solid evidence' that AI prompts or queries used by Drs. Oreskes and Kaurov existed at one time, and thus, an order of production is warranted."

Oliver also rejected two procedural objections. He held that the foundation waived its argument that Farrish improperly enforced requests sent by email rather than formally served, because it never raised the point before Farrish. He added that the argument would fail anyway because the foundation had answered the emailed requests without objecting to how they were served. Even assuming the motion to compel was late, he wrote, the defendants showed diligence by sending a deficiency letter 10 days after Oreskes's deposition and conferring with the foundation at least seven times before going to Farrish.

Kristine Sears Tardiff of the Conservation Law Foundation represented the foundation. Drew Bell of King & Spalding LLP represented defendant Equilon.

With the stay lifted, the foundation must comply in full with Farrish's May 18 order by Dec. 18, 2026.