Key Points

  • The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Colorado notary Skipton S. Reynolds's special appearance and rendered judgment dismissing the claims against him for want of personal jurisdiction.
  • Accepting as true that Reynolds notarized the deed in Colorado knowing it concerned Texas land intended for use in Texas, the court held that he did not purposefully avail himself of Texas, because the Texas connection arose from the unilateral choices of the person seeking his notary services.
  • As an alternative ground, the court held that the deed's subject matter and intended use are not substantially connected to the operative facts of negligent-notarization claims, which turn on whether the notary verified the signer's identity in Colorado.
  • The court distinguished Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co. as a fraudulent-transfer case in which the Texas property was essential to the claim, and followed out-of-state professional-services cases including Brocail, Markette, and Eakin.
  • The court did not reach Reynolds's remaining issues, including his argument that he negated the only alleged Texas contact.

A Texas appeals court ruled Tuesday that a Colorado lawyer whose notary certificate appeared on a forged deed to a vacant Bexar County lot cannot be sued in Texas courts. The court held that notarizing a deed in Colorado does not tie a notary to Texas just because the land it conveys lies in Texas.

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio reversed a trial court order that had kept Skipton S. Reynolds, a Colorado lawyer and notary, in a lawsuit over the forged conveyance. It dismissed the claims against him for want of personal jurisdiction. Justice Velia J. Meza wrote the opinion for a three-justice panel that also included Chief Justice Rebeca C. Martinez and Justice Lori I. Valenzuela.

The panel assumed that Reynolds knew the deed concerned Texas property and was meant for use in Texas. Even so, it held, that knowledge did not allow Texas courts to hear claims that he notarized the deed negligently. The court treated notary work like the services of out-of-state lawyers and doctors, looking to where the work was performed.

According to the pleadings, Estella and Michael Martinez owned a vacant lot in Bexar County. An unidentified woman impersonated the couple, listed the property for sale and purported to convey it to ABMF, LLC. The deed, dated January 11, 2023, bore Reynolds's notary certificate. ABMF alleged that Reynolds notarized the deed in Arapahoe County, Colorado, and that it was recorded in Bexar County the next day.

Vena Homes, LLC then began building a house on the lot for ABMF. The Martinezes discovered the construction and told ABMF and Vena Homes that they had not sold the property. Construction stopped, and ABMF gave the Martinezes a quitclaim deed to the lot.

The litigation that followed included claims that Reynolds notarized the deed without confirming the identity of the people claiming to be the Martinezes. Under both Texas and Colorado law, the opinion noted, a notary must know or have satisfactory evidence that the signer is the person identified in the document.

Reynolds filed a special appearance challenging personal jurisdiction. He argued that his notary credentials had been stolen and that someone had impersonated him. Judge Nicole Garza of the 45th Judicial District Court in Bexar County denied the special appearance after a hearing, and Reynolds brought an interlocutory appeal.

On appeal, Reynolds argued that the Texas long-arm statute does not reach notary services performed in Colorado. The panel did not decide whether Reynolds had been impersonated. It accepted the plaintiffs' allegations as true, "including that Reynolds notarized the deed in Colorado knowing that it concerned Texas property and was intended for use in Texas," and held that those facts still fell short.

The parties agreed that Reynolds was not subject to general jurisdiction, which applies when a defendant's contacts make it "essentially at home in the forum state." That left specific jurisdiction, which requires that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privileges and protections of Texas law and that the claims relate to those contacts.

ABMF argued that by notarizing a deed conveying Texas property, Reynolds purposefully took part in a transaction involving Texas property. It relied on Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., a 2009 Texas Supreme Court decision that upheld jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant that had purchased property in Texas.

The panel found the case closer to Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten. In that 2005 decision, the Texas Supreme Court held that an Indiana seller did not purposefully avail itself of Texas even though it knew the buyer would take a recreational vehicle there. "The plaintiffs do not allege that Reynolds solicited the transaction or acquired any interest in the property," Meza wrote for the court. Reynolds's "knowledge that it would be used in Texas does not, on these facts, establish that Reynolds sought the benefits or protections of Texas law," the opinion said.

The court then gave a second, independent reason for its ruling. Even if Reynolds had purposefully availed himself of Texas, the panel held, the claims lacked "a substantial connection between [a defendant's forum] contacts and the operative facts of the litigation," the test the Texas Supreme Court applied in its 2007 decision in Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg.

The panel looked to cases involving out-of-state professionals. In Brocail v. Anderson, a Houston appeals court held that a Michigan physician's prescription sent to Texas was too insubstantial a contact, because the medical judgment occurred in Michigan. In Eakin v. Acosta, the Fourth Court held that a Florida lawyer's communications with a Texas client did not establish jurisdiction because the lawyer did the work in Florida.

The panel also distinguished Retamco on relatedness, noting that the Texas property in that case was essential to a fraudulent-transfer claim against the defendant. "This case is about negligent services, not about a fraudulent transfer claim against Reynolds," Meza wrote. "The location of the land conveyed in the deed does not bear in any manner on whether Reynolds exercised reasonable care in notarizing the deed, i.e., verifying the signer's identity."

The court concluded that the alleged Texas contacts, "the deed's subject matter and intended use," were not substantially connected to the operative facts of the claims against Reynolds. The trial court, it held, should have granted the special appearance.

Reynolds was represented by J. Andrew Hutton of Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP. ABMF was represented by Chad M. Upham of Brock Upham Yost & Streiber PLLC, and the Martinezes by Roy Barrera III of The Barrera Firm.

Having sustained Reynolds's second issue on appeal, the panel did not reach Reynolds's other arguments, including that he had negated the only alleged Texas contact. Rather than remanding, the court rendered judgment dismissing the claims against him.