Key Points

  • Under federal maritime law, a pilot association is not vicariously liable for a member pilot's navigation unless it controls the pilot's performance of navigational duties.
  • Allegations that a pilot is the association's employee, member or shareholder do not by themselves plausibly show such control.
  • The First Circuit declined to limit Guy v. Donald (1906) to unincorporated, voluntary associations and applied it to a mandatory, for-profit, incorporated association.
  • Massachusetts's pilotage rules place navigational duties and bond requirements on pilots alone and give Northeast Marine Pilots dispatch, pilot-boat and administrative functions.
  • A plaintiff must state a plausible claim before it can obtain discovery into an association's control over pilots.

A Massachusetts pilot association cannot be held responsible under federal maritime law for a member pilot's handling of a foreign vessel that struck a hurricane barrier, a federal appeals court ruled Tuesday. The court held that dispatching pilots and collecting their fees does not amount to control over how they navigate.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of negligence, indemnity and contribution claims that Codan Forsikring A/S, the vessel owner's insurer, brought against Northeast Marine Pilots Inc. Judge Lynch wrote the opinion for a panel that also included Chief Judge Barron and Judge Gelpí. The ruling means Codan, which paid more than $750,000 after the accident, cannot pursue those tort claims against the association on the theory that it answers for pilot Sean Bogus.

The decision applies a 1906 Supreme Court precedent, Guy v. Donald, which involved a voluntary, unincorporated association, to an incorporated association that pilots in the district must join. The panel held that allegations that Bogus was the association's employee and shareholder were not enough. "Whatever a pilot's employment relationship with a pilot association, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the pilot association exercises control over the pilot's performance of his navigational duties," Judge Lynch wrote.

According to the complaint, Bogus was piloting the 3,424-ton KOMMANDOR SUSAN, owned by Hays Ships Ltd., out of the Port of New Bedford on May 23, 2020. The vessel's master and a deck officer shouted to him that the vessel's rear was approaching a hurricane barrier, but he did not alter course. The ship struck the barrier, which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers owns and maintains, substantially damaging both. Codan, suing as Hays's subrogee, covered the Corps's claim and the repairs.

The case turned on vicarious liability, which federal maritime law imposes on employers for employees' wrongful acts in the course of their employment. Under Massachusetts law, foreign vessels of at least 350 gross tons must hire a commissioned pilot to enter or leave the state's shoreline districts. In the relevant district, pilots must belong to Northeast Pilots, which staffs a dispatch office, provides pilot boats and assigns pilots by a fixed rotation. Pilot commissioners appointed by the governor commission and discipline pilots, and state law makes each pilot liable for damages from his own "negligence, unskillfulness or unfaithfulness."

Codan argued that the general common-law test for separating employees from independent contractors should apply. Under that test, it said, Bogus was an employee because the association is in the pilotage business, Bogus could not refuse assignments and vessels pay the association rather than the pilot. The opinion notes that Codan at first conceded at oral argument that it had to allege the association controlled Bogus, then appeared to retract that concession on rebuttal.

The panel rejected the employment test in this setting. It relied on Guy, in which the Supreme Court held that members of the Virginia Pilot Association were not liable for a member pilot's piloting decisions. That decision started from the principle that one is not liable for another's torts "when he could not select, could not control, and could not discharge the guilty man." The Second Circuit in 1917 and the Fifth Circuit in 1929 reached similar conclusions.

Massachusetts's rules, the court found, do not give Northeast Pilots any say over pilots' navigation choices. They impose navigational duties and a bond requirement on pilots alone. Codan's complaint itself alleged that Bogus "operated the Vessel on his own," and it contained no allegation that the association trains, communicates with or directs pilots in their navigation. "As in Guy and Dampskibsselskabet, assigning pilots to vessels and collecting fees do not equate to controlling a pilot's performance of his navigational duties," Judge Lynch wrote.

The court also rejected Codan's analogy to law firms and hospitals, which Codan said courts routinely hold vicariously liable for employees' torts even though Massachusetts also regulates lawyers and healthcare providers. It quoted the Supreme Court's statement that pilotage "is a unique institution and must be judged as such."

Codan offered three reasons to set Guy aside, and the panel rejected each. First, although Guy involved claims against an association's members, the Supreme Court had analyzed the association's own power over pilots. Second, "we decline to limit Guy's holding to unincorporated, voluntary pilot associations," Judge Lynch wrote, while agreeing that corporate form is relevant to the inquiry. Third, Codan's point that earlier cases were decided only after discovery failed because a plaintiff "must state a plausible claim before [it] can invoke a right to discovery."

The panel did not rule out liability for every pilot association. Nothing in Massachusetts law, Judge Lynch wrote, "would expressly bar a pilot association from taking other steps that hypothetically might lead to plausible inferences that it exercised sufficient control over member pilots' performance of their navigational duties." The court also left open how federal maritime law interacts with state law, which the parties had not briefed, concluding only that courts may look to local law to determine who controls pilots.

Olaf Aprans represented Codan, with Farrell Smith O'Connell Aarsheim Aprans LLP on the brief. Joshua Parks represented Northeast Pilots, with Adler Pollock & Sheehan PC on the brief. Brendan P. O'Shea was on a brief for the American Pilots' Association, which filed as amicus curiae supporting Northeast Pilots.

The ruling came on an interlocutory appeal, which federal law permits for certain admiralty orders. U.S. District Judge Myong J. Joun of the District of Massachusetts had dismissed the three tort counts in July 2025 but kept Codan's breach of contract and breach of warranty claims against Northeast Pilots. In September 2025, the district court granted the parties' joint motion to stay the case pending the appeal. Those contract claims, and the claims against Bogus, who has answered the complaint, remain before the district court.