Key Points

  • The Fourth District held that section 627.748(18), Florida Statutes, bars a rider's negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims against Lyft arising from a driver's alleged assault.
  • The court held that the statute's 'Vicarious liability' title does not limit its text, which reaches any claim in which the company's network affiliation with the driver is a but-for cause of its alleged liability.
  • The court read the exception for 'negligence under this section' to mean a negligent failure to meet the rideshare statute's requirements, not any negligence related to operating the network.
  • The court held that the immunity is not a traditional affirmative defense, so a plaintiff must plead facts satisfying one of the statute's exceptions to survive a motion to dismiss.
  • On rehearing, the court withdrew and replaced its May 13, 2026, opinion, denied rehearing en banc and certification, and again affirmed the dismissal with prejudice.

A Florida appeals court on Wednesday reaffirmed that a 2020 state law shields Lyft from a passenger's lawsuit claiming the company's safety advertising led her into a ride during which her driver assaulted her.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a Broward County judge's dismissal with prejudice of Louise Haddad's negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims against Lyft Florida, Inc. Judge Lott wrote the opinion, and Judges Klingensmith and Shaw concurred. The court granted Haddad's motion for rehearing, withdrew its May 13, 2026, opinion and substituted the new one, but reached the same result. It denied her motions for rehearing en banc and for certification.

The decision holds that section 627.748(18), Florida Statutes, which the opinion calls "Subsection 18," bars claims against a rideshare company that rest on the company's own alleged wrongdoing, not just its driver's. It also holds that a plaintiff must plead facts fitting one of the statute's exceptions in the complaint itself to survive a motion to dismiss. "The scope of immunity provided by Subsection 18’s plain text is very broad," Lott wrote.

The court said the provision "appears to sweep in practically any claim against Lyft (or a similar rideshare network operator)" for injury arising from the use of a rideshare vehicle, "regardless of how Lyft may have directly caused or contributed to the injury," so long as the company complies with the rideshare statute and avoids criminal conduct.

"Whether the legislators who voted on the text of the statute actually intended to confer such broad immunity is immaterial," Lott wrote, adding that whether such immunity is wise "is not a question for this branch to answer."

Haddad alleges that she took a Lyft ride on April 15, 2022, and that the driver assaulted her, causing severe and permanent injuries. Her complaint says Lyft's website advertised "High safety standards" and "Proactive safety measures" and represented that drivers must pass background checks and annual re-screening. She alleges she relied on those statements in deciding to ride. The merits of her claims were not before the court.

The legislature enacted section 627.748 in 2017 to regulate transportation network companies, or TNCs, which use a digital network to connect riders with drivers. Subsection 18, added in 2020, provides that a TNC "is not liable under general law" for harm arising from the use of a vehicle while the driver is logged on to the network. The rule applies if the company commits "no negligence under this section or criminal wrongdoing," has met its obligations under the section as to the driver, and is not the vehicle's owner or bailee.

Haddad argued that Subsection 18, which bears the title "Vicarious liability," reaches only vicarious liability, which makes one party answer for another's wrongful acts, and not claims over Lyft's own misrepresentations. "But that is simply not what Subsection 18 says," Lott wrote, citing precedent that a statute's heading cannot limit the plain meaning of its text.

The court focused on the statute's phrase "by reason of," which it read to require but-for causation. That language "is far broader than traditional vicarious liability, and applies to cases in which Lyft’s network affiliation with the driver is a but-for causal element of Lyft’s alleged liability," the opinion said. "It does not matter that the complaint purports to plead negligence by Lyft rather than a traditional vicarious liability theory," Lott added.

The panel left open whether a driver's assault is harm that "arises out of the use, operation, or possession of a motor vehicle." Haddad had not contested that point in her briefs, so the court assumed it. "We did not have the benefit of adversary briefing on that question, and accordingly, we leave that question for another day," Lott wrote.

Haddad also argued that her claims fit the statute's exception for "negligence under this section," which she read to mean any negligence related to Lyft's operation of its digital network. The court disagreed, holding that the phrase "plainly means a negligent failure to meet the statute’s requirements." It noted that the Graves Amendment, the 2005 federal law shielding vehicle-rental businesses from vicarious liability on which Subsection 18 was based, carves out any negligence and lacks the words "under this section." Under Haddad's reading, Lott wrote, those words would add nothing: "How else would a TNC network operator be negligent other than through its operation of a TNC network?"

Haddad also contended that the trial court improperly applied the immunity, which she treated as an affirmative defense, at the motion to dismiss stage. An affirmative defense is a matter the defendant must prove and the plaintiff need not anticipate in the complaint. The court held that Subsection 18 "is not a traditional affirmative defense, but a broader immunity cutting to the core of a cause of action against a TNC." It pointed to other Florida statutes that use "there is no liability" language to confer broad immunities.

Under that reading, the statute's three conditions operate as exceptions that a plaintiff must plead. "The complaint needs to plead facts to overcome the immunity and background state of 'no liability,' unlike the case with a traditional affirmative defense," the court held. The trial court had found no such allegations in an earlier complaint and let her amend. "Haddad failed to do so here, even when given the explicit opportunity by the trial court," Lott wrote.

Haddad was represented by John S. Mills of The Mills Firm, P.A., and Lyft by Brigid F. Cech Samole of Greenberg Traurig, P.A. Andrew A. Harris of Harris Appeals, P.A., represented the Florida Justice Association, whose amicus brief supporting Haddad's rehearing motions the court accepted.

The substituted opinion leaves in place Broward Circuit Judge David Alan Haimes' dismissal of Haddad's claims against Lyft with prejudice. The opinion states that it is not final until the court disposes of any timely-filed motion for rehearing.