Key Points

  • The Indiana Supreme Court, 3-2, reversed partial summary judgment that had held Tesla vicariously liable as a matter of law for an employee's crash during his morning commute in a company service truck.
  • The majority held that conflicting evidence over whether the employee was on the clock and whether Tesla's informal quarter-tank refueling practice was a required task creates a genuine factual dispute for a jury under Indiana's going-and-coming rule.
  • The court left intact the jury's 70%/30% allocation of fault and, citing Appellate Rule 66(D), remanded for a new trial limited to vicarious liability and damages.
  • Justice Goff, joined by Chief Justice Rush, dissented on vicarious liability, writing that the record conclusively showed the employee acted within the scope of his employment and that the scope of employment covers authorized acts, not only required ones.
  • The court summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals on the remaining issues and took no position on whether the plaintiff's trial counsel violated Professional Conduct Rule 4.2.

Indiana's highest court on Wednesday threw out a ruling that made Tesla, Inc. legally responsible for a 2017 crash in which one of its service workers, driving a company truck to work, struck a motorcyclist. The court held that a jury must decide whether the worker was doing Tesla's business when he turned into a gas station.

Justice Slaughter wrote for the 3-2 majority, joined by Justices Massa and Molter. Justice Goff, joined by Chief Justice Rush, dissented on that question. The decision reverses partial summary judgment that had found Tesla vicariously liable as a matter of law.

The court ordered a new trial on whether Tesla is vicariously liable, meaning responsible for an employee's negligence because of the employment relationship, and on damages. It left standing the jury's finding that the employee was 70% at fault and the motorcyclist 30%. The case turns on Indiana's "going-and-coming" rule, under which a commuting worker generally is not acting within the scope of employment, and on whether an informal refueling practice pulled one commute into the workday.

According to the opinion, Kyle Kaszuba worked as a service assistant at Tesla. In April 2017 he drove a Tesla service truck to drop off a company trailer for repair near the end of his workday. His manager, Seth Aichinger, let him take the truck home to avoid rush-hour traffic. Tesla's service team had an "informal policy" that an employee returning a company vehicle with less than a quarter tank of gas should fill it.

During his roughly fifty-mile commute to the service center on April 25, Kaszuba noticed the tank was below one-fourth. He turned left into a Speedway station on Rockville Road and struck Christopher Dugan, who was riding a motorcycle without a helmet. Dugan suffered a traumatic brain injury and a partial amputation of his left foot. After the trial court found him incompetent, his mother and guardian, Annamarie Dugan Norris, took his place as plaintiff.

Norris and Kaszuba both asked the trial court to rule that Kaszuba was acting for Tesla, and Kaszuba later joined Tesla's appeal on every issue except that one. The Marion Superior Court agreed with them, finding that "Kaszuba was on a special errand for his employer to fill the service truck with gas before returning to the company office." A jury then awarded $60,687,491, reduced by 30% for Dugan's share of fault.

The Indiana Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the liability ruling in 2025, calling the gas stop "a required task integral to returning the employer's property in the condition the employer expected and required." The same panel ordered a new damages trial, however. Jurors had reported an impasse, and the judge declared a mistrial, then "un-granted" it after speaking privately with jurors.

"We hold that the evidence designated below presents a material factual dispute over whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment," Justice Slaughter wrote. Kaszuba said he would clock in as soon as he entered the truck, so he believed he was working at the time of the crash. Aichinger testified that Kaszuba "was not clocked in during his morning commute on April 25" and "was not paid" for that time.

The record on the gas stop was split the same way. Aichinger testified that the practice "wasn't a rule. It was not an official corporate policy," and Tesla designated evidence that keeping the tank above a quarter "was a recommendation, not a required job duty." The majority noted that Norris conceded at oral argument that nothing in the record showed the policy applied to a personal commute. "A reasonable jury could also find for Tesla on the same evidence and conclude that Kaszuba stopped for gas independently to benefit himself or as a favor to fellow employees," Justice Slaughter wrote.

The majority relied on the court's 1997 decision in Warner Trucking, Inc. v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Co., which left to a jury whether an employee drove a company truck to a gas station on his own initiative. It added that an employer's paying for gas does not by itself make a commute part of the job. Answering the dissent's charge that it had mischaracterized the record, the majority wrote: "We do not mischaracterize the record by quoting it." The jury "may see things differently, but that prerogative belongs to the jury, not to us," it added.

Justice Goff wrote that the evidence "conclusively shows that the employee here—the Driver, as I'll refer to him—had acted within the course and scope of his employment with Tesla." He cited the employee's testimony that the manager "stated that I have to do this; I need to do it," and wrote that the scope of employment reaches acts an employer authorizes, not only those it requires. "Why else would the service truck contain a dedicated gas card for the employee's use?" he wrote. Twice the dissent concluded that "the Court creates a material-fact issue where none exists."

The majority also rejected Tesla's request for a new trial on every liability and damages issue. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(D), a new trial "shall be limited to those parties and issues affected by the error unless this would be impracticable or unfair." Justice Slaughter wrote that "it would not enhance judicial efficiency to require a new jury to apportion fault, where no error affected the original jury's determination."

The justices summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals on the remaining trial issues, including its reversal of the damages verdict. They took no position on that court's finding that Norris's trial lawyer violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 by speaking with Kaszuba in a bathroom shortly before he testified.

Tesla's attorneys included Daniel E. Pulliam of Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP and lawyers from Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP. Kaszuba was represented by Clark Johnson & Knight, Ltd. Norris's attorneys included Steven David of Church Church Hittle + Antrim and lawyers from Christie Farrell Lee & Bell P.C.

The case returns to the Marion Superior Court for a new trial on vicarious liability and damages. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and the parties may not act in reliance on the opinion until it is certified.