Key Points

  • The First Department unanimously affirmed dismissal of JRT Realty Group's amended complaint against Cushman & Wakefield and the other defendants in its entirety.
  • An April 2024 email to city officials about a subcontractor's performance on a City contract was protected speech on an issue of public interest under Civil Rights Law ยง 76-a, even though it was initially sent internally to government officials.
  • A verified complaint can serve as an affidavit on the anti-SLAPP substantial-basis burden, but a complaint resting on inferred meanings rather than concrete false statements needed additional supporting evidence.
  • JRT, the designated M/WBE subcontractor, lacked standing to enforce the professional services contract with DCAS because its provisions ran exclusively to the agency.
  • The tortious interference, declaratory judgment, implied covenant and unfair competition claims were also properly dismissed.

A New York appeals court on Thursday held that the state's anti-SLAPP law covers an email to New York City officials about a subcontractor's work on a city contract, and it affirmed the dismissal of the subcontractor's defamation suit against Cushman & Wakefield Inc. along with every other claim in the case.

The Appellate Division, First Department, ruled unanimously against JRT Realty Group Inc., the designated M/WBE subcontractor on a professional services contract with the city's Department of Citywide Administrative Services. The panel of Justices Manzanet-Daniels, who presided, Shulman, Rodriguez, Higgitt and Rosado issued an unsigned decision upholding a June 23, 2025, order by Justice Anar R. Patel of Supreme Court, New York County, that dismissed JRT's amended complaint against all defendants.

The ruling applies the anti-SLAPP statute to an email that was initially sent internally to government officials. It also holds that JRT's sworn complaint, which rested on implications rather than concrete false statements, could not by itself sustain the defamation claim.

Under the statute, as the decision describes it, once a defendant establishes that a claim targets protected speech, the plaintiff must show a "substantial basis in law" for the claim under CPLR 3211(g)(1).

The dispute centers on an April 2024 email. The decision does not quote the message, but it describes JRT's allegations as resting on the defendants' statements "regarding how plaintiff's account would be handled going forward and asserting performance issues." JRT also alleged that the defendants stopped assigning it new work, disputed its access to information and misappropriated its "know-how" and methods. It sued for defamation, tortious interference with prospective business relations, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unfair competition, and it sought a declaration about future commissions.

The panel held that the email was protected conduct "in connection with an issue of public interest" under Civil Rights Law Section 76-a(1)(a)(2). "Although the allegedly defamatory communication was initially sent internally to government officials, it addressed issues relating to a subcontractor's performance on a City contract that are not 'purely private matters' but fall squarely within the broad definition of public interest under the statute," the court wrote.

The panel added that "an email sent to a government agency concerning such matters is not directed to a limited, private audience." It also held that Supreme Court properly rejected JRT's argument that the email was "unlawful conduct" outside the statute's protection, writing that the law "contemplates acts such as fraud, threats, or harassment that are not alleged here."

On JRT's burden, the court said the substantial-basis test does not impose a "clear and convincing evidence" burden at the pleading stage, citing its 2026 decision in Reeves v. Foundation for the Child Victims of the Family Courts. But the panel wrote that the test "requires such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate." Citing Reeves v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., a 2024 First Department decision, it called that standard more exacting than the ordinary one under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

The panel acknowledged that a complaint verified by a person with personal knowledge of the facts may be used as an affidavit and can satisfy the burden, citing Mancilla & Fantone, LLP v. Liu. But the standard was not met here. "The allegations in the complaint rest almost entirely on meanings that can be inferred from defendants' statements," the court wrote, referring to statements about JRT's account and performance, "rather than concrete false statements." As a result, the panel held, JRT "needed to submit supporting evidence in addition to the verified allegations in order to satisfy the heightened substantial-basis standard."

The tortious interference claim fell for two reasons. To the extent it relied on the April email, the court held, it was subject to and defeated by the same anti-SLAPP analysis. The other conduct JRT cited, including the decision to stop assigning it new work, "at most, may have been a contractual breach, but not a wrongful act that can constitute tortious interference," the panel wrote.

The contract claims failed for lack of standing. The city contract references JRT as the designated M/WBE subcontractor, the court said, but its provisions on staffing, subcontractor changes and compliance "constitute promises running exclusively to DCAS, a public agency with sole enforcement authority." Nothing in the contract gave JRT independent remedial rights or made it an intended third-party beneficiary, the panel held. Even assuming standing, it found the alleged breaches of four contract sections either conclusory or dependent on obligations owed solely to the agency.

Because JRT could not enforce the city contract and no contract between JRT and the defendants governed the conduct at issue, the implied covenant claim also failed. The court held that the request for a declaration about future commissions was unripe. "Any commission dispute may be litigated if and when a specific underpayment occurs," the panel wrote, which avoids an advisory opinion on hypothetical future obligations.

The unfair competition claim failed because the complaint did not identify any protectable proprietary information or trade secrets belonging to JRT. The panel distinguished its 2024 decision in Valkyrie AI LLC v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, noting that JRT's complaint "is not bolstered by affidavit evidence indicating the novelty and secrecy of plaintiff's methods."

The court also held that Justice Patel properly treated the motion to dismiss as made on behalf of all defendants. JRT's briefs addressed the defendants collectively, the panel said, and JRT identified no prejudice from the ruling.

JRT was represented by Carmine J. Castellano of Hodgson Russ LLP. The defendants were represented by Jeremy A. Cohen of Braunhagey & Borden LLP.

The panel affirmed the order without costs, leaving the dismissal in place as to all defendants. The decision, 2026 NY Slip Op 06400, is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.