Key Points
- Judge Kacsmaryk granted the parties' amended joint motion for entry of a consent order (ECF No. 35) and denied the original motion (ECF No. 30) as moot.
- The court will separately enter a consent order materially identical to the parties' proposal, which declares USDA programs under Titles 7 and 16 unconstitutional to the extent they give preferential treatment to "socially disadvantaged" farmers and ranchers using race- and sex-based classifications.
- The court found the consent order arises from the pleaded case, reflects a reasonable legal determination consistent with Strickland v. USDA, and has minimal or no negative impact on third parties.
- The court found the class settlement fair, reasonable and adequate under Rule 23(e)(2) and the Fifth Circuit's Reed factors, holding the parties remain adverse because USDA still implements the challenged programs as required by statute.
- The parties must file a joint status report on attorney's fees and other collateral issues by Jan. 19, 2027, and the case remains open.
A federal judge in Amarillo, Texas, on Nov. 19 approved a nationwide class settlement in which the U.S. Department of Agriculture stipulates that its preferences for "socially disadvantaged" farmers and ranchers are unconstitutional to the extent they rest on race or sex. The judge found that the deal arose from the farmers' lawsuit, reflected what he called "the correct legal outcome" and cost the class little or nothing.
U.S. District Judge Matthew J. Kacsmaryk granted the parties' amended joint motion for entry of a consent order, a court-entered judgment that embodies a settlement, and said he would separately enter an order "materially identical" to the one the farmers and the government proposed. That proposed order includes a declaratory judgment that certain programs under Titles 7 and 16 of the U.S. Code and their regulations are unconstitutional to the extent they require preferential treatment using race- and sex-based classifications. It also requires the government to pay the plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and the court keeps jurisdiction.
The settlement covers a class Kacsmaryk certified in July: all farmers and ranchers in the United States who are encountering or will encounter USDA race or sex discrimination "based on their exclusion from its 'socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher' designation" and who have been or will be denied benefits or program access on that basis. Kacsmaryk wrote that the consent order "gives class members all the relief they could have sought in this case and asks them to compromise little or nothing."
The Texas Farm Bureau and other named plaintiffs sued on Aug. 8, 2025, asserting Fifth Amendment claims of race- and sex-based discrimination in USDA programs. According to the order, USDA "is required by statute to administer programs which provide additional benefits to 'socially disadvantaged' farmers and ranchers based on race and sex." The amended complaint challenges "all . . . USDA programs that discriminate against farmers and ranchers based on race or sex using the 'socially disadvantaged' category."
On Feb. 10, 2026, the government told the court it agreed the programs "are unconstitutional to the extent they include preferences based on race or sex." Its notice described the designation as "a category defined solely in terms of race and sex." The government filed a letter from U.S. Solicitor General D. John Sauer, which the order calls the "530D Letter," explaining that position, and the court let the government treat the letter as its response to the amended complaint.
The plaintiffs moved to certify a class on Feb. 27, and the government "took no substantive position on this motion." Even in the settlement, the government does not concede liability. According to the order, the defendants "do not admit to liability under the Constitution or laws of the United States," but agree "for the purposes of this Consent Order" that using race- and sex-based classifications to determine program benefits is "not supported by the Constitution."
Kacsmaryk wrote that a court reviewing a consent order "must not merely sign on the line provided by the parties," quoting the Fifth Circuit's 1981 decision in United States v. City of Miami. Because this one settles class claims, he analyzed it twice: as a consent order, and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), which lets a judge approve a settlement binding class members "only after a hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate." He held that hearing Nov. 19.
He gave three reasons the consent order was appropriate. First, it "arise[s] from the pleaded case," because it declares unconstitutional the same programs the complaint challenged. Second, the agreement is a reasonable legal determination, he wrote, noting that the court held in Strickland v. USDA in 2024 that USDA's sex- and race-based preferences "are likely unconstitutional" and that the proposed order "follows directly from that opinion."
Third, Kacsmaryk found that the order's effect on people outside the case "is neither unreasonable nor proscribed." Only the named plaintiffs are barred from suing these defendants for further relief over the preferences, he wrote. Class members release the defendants "solely for the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief set forth in the Complaint."
The judge also took up whether a deal between two sides that agree on the law was negotiated at arm's length, one of the Rule 23 factors. He found that "the parties remain adverse, despite the USDA's adoption of Plaintiff's view of the constitutionality of the challenged programs, because USDA still implements the challenged programs as required by statute." He also wrote, "There is no evidence that the settlement was reached by collusion."
On the remaining Rule 23 factors, Kacsmaryk found that class counsel and the class representatives adequately represented the class, that the settlement gives the class all the relief it sought while placing no limit on non-named members seeking other relief, and that each class member receives the same declaratory relief. Settling now, he wrote, "avoids the costs and risks of proceeding to summary judgment and a potential appeal."
He reached the same result under the Fifth Circuit's six-factor Reed test for class settlements. The case "would likely not have involved much, if any, discovery," he wrote, but settling still saves costs compared with cross motions for summary judgment. "Given the Court's previous disposition in Strickland, Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits," Kacsmaryk wrote, adding that the court had not heard any objections from counsel, class representatives or absent class members.
The parties first filed their joint motion on Sept. 23, 2026. At the hearing they identified several minor typographical errors, and the court ordered an amended motion; Kacsmaryk denied the original as moot.
Michael Lee Byrd of Michael L. Byrd & Associates represented the Texas Farm Bureau. Natalie Moreland Villalon of the Justice Department's Civil Division represented the United States Department of Agriculture.
The court will separately enter the consent order. The parties must file a joint status report on attorney's fees and any other collateral issues by 5 p.m. Central time on Jan. 19, 2027, and the clerk was directed to keep the case open until those issues are resolved.