Key Points

  • The Mississippi Supreme Court answered yes to the Fifth Circuit's certified question: Section 41-41-211(2) requires health care providers, absent a designated surrogate, to identify qualifying family members and ensure no higher-priority member is reasonably available before relying on a lower-priority member's decision.
  • The court interpreted the statute's "descending order of priority" language to mean precedence, relying on the 1993 Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and a comment to the 2023 version.
  • The majority rejected the argument by Brandon Nursing and two health care associations that the requirement unduly burdens providers, citing the statutory definition of "reasonably available" as contact "without undue effort."
  • Justice Griffis, joined by two colleagues, dissented, reading the act to impose no search duty on providers and to leave higher-priority relatives free to disqualify a surrogate.
  • The answer returns to the Fifth Circuit, which is reviewing the denial of Brandon Nursing's motion to compel arbitration of a suit seeking more than $26 million over burn injuries.

The Mississippi Supreme Court held Thursday that the state's Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, which lists the relatives who may make medical decisions for an incapacitated patient "in descending order of priority," sets a rule of precedence. A health care provider must therefore identify qualifying family members and confirm that none with higher priority is reasonably available before relying on a decision by a lower-ranking relative, the court said.

The 5-3 answer to a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted the reading urged by Mark Stanford, who was admitted to Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center in 2017, and by the federal district court. The court rejected Brandon Nursing's argument that priority matters only when relatives of different ranks disagree.

The ruling bears on whether Stanford's brother had authority to sign an arbitration agreement on his behalf when Stanford's adult son ranked higher under the statute. The Fifth Circuit found the statute's meaning determinative of Brandon Nursing's appeal from an order refusing to send Stanford's injury suit, which seeks more than $26 million, to arbitration.

Justice Ishee wrote for the court, joined by Chief Justice Randolph, Presiding Justice King, and Justices Sullivan and Wilson. Justice Griffis dissented, joined by Presiding Justice Coleman and Justice Branning. Justice Tollison did not participate.

According to the opinion, Stanford, who suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and mental impairment, was admitted to Brandon Nursing in May 2017. When his physician declared him unable to make health care decisions that June, the facility required the appointment of a surrogate, a person other than an agent or guardian who is authorized to make those decisions. His brother, Russell Phillips, signed the facility's forms, which "incorrectly listed Phillips as an 'adult child' of Stanford." Phillips also signed an arbitration agreement that was mandatory for admission and covered all disputes exceeding $25,000.

In January 2022, Stanford inadvertently set himself, his bed and his oxygen tank on fire while playing with a cigarette lighter. The sprinkler system in his room failed to deploy, and he suffered second- and third-degree burns. Stanford, suing through his guardian and conservator, Erik Phillips, filed suit in October 2022 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Opposing Brandon Nursing's motion to compel arbitration, Stanford argued that his son, Mark Sanderson, held higher priority and was reasonably available, so Phillips lacked authority to bind him. Brandon Nursing replied that Sanderson had declined to serve, had not objected for four years, and was raising the issue "to skew the surrogate requirements to avoid arbitration." The district court denied the motion in September 2024, calling priority "a precondition of the statute's affirmative grant of permission for one to act as a decisionmaker—not a method of determining post hoc which decision controls." It found no evidence that Sanderson had declined, and it found that Brandon Nursing never contacted him though it had his contact information.

Before the state high court, Brandon Nursing argued that "priority only becomes an issue when a conflict arises between surrogates of different classes." Stanford argued that "[p]riority is unequivocally a precondition to surrogacy."

Justice Ishee relied on the model uniform act, whose 1993 version Mississippi adopted and which calls selection by priority a "default rule," and on a comment to its 2023 version stating that "[b]y adopting a priority list, the Act rejects an alternative approach taken by a minority of states that gives a patient's physician substantial discretion to select among potential surrogates." Reading priority as precedence, he wrote, best supports the act's purpose of "promoting prompt administration of healthcare by a family member most likely to act in accordance with the patient's wishes."

The court also rejected a warning from the Mississippi Health Care Association and the Mississippi Hospital Association, which supported Brandon Nursing, that the reading "places an onerous burden on all health care providers for each health care decision which might be made in rendering patient care." The statute defines reasonably available in part as "readily able to be contacted without undue effort," Justice Ishee noted. "It is far-fetched to argue that such a minimal standard places an onerous burden on healthcare providers," he wrote.

The associations' concern about proving availability years later, while reasonable, was "also purely speculative," the majority said, because numerous other states' statutes explicitly require providers to contact the highest-priority relative and "this Court has not found a single case in which this requirement has been an issue."

In dissent, Justice Griffis wrote that "no provision in the Act requires a healthcare provider to take affirmative steps to ensure a higher-priority family member is not reasonably available before relying on a healthcare decision of a known reasonably available lower-priority family member." He cited a provision shielding providers who follow a decision by a person "apparently having authority," and he read the commas around the priority phrase as making it parenthetical.

He also read subsection 211(4) to place the duty of notifying relatives on the surrogate, not the provider. "If the majority is correct and the provider has the responsibility to identify the priority among qualifying family members before admission, then I challenge my colleagues to explain the purpose of subsection 211(4)," he wrote. He added: "All Sanderson had to do to take over the healthcare decisions of his father was to simply tell Brandon Nursing, either in writing or orally, that he wanted to disqualify Phillips." He wrote that "the record before us contains no evidence Sanderson was reasonably available."

W. Davis Frye represented the appellant. Richard Paul Williams, III represented the appellee.

The case returns to the Fifth Circuit. The Mississippi court said it would address only the legal question, quoting its precedent that "fact finding and law application is the responsibility of the fact-finding court, which in this instance is the Fifth Circuit."