Key Points

  • Judge Saylor held that under the False Claims Act's false certification theory, the government must prove that claims were the reasonably foreseeable result of Regeneron's conduct, not that Regeneron's conduct was their but-for cause.
  • The order granted the government's partial summary judgment motion only to the extent it sought that legal ruling and otherwise denied it.
  • The court denied summary judgment on whether every Eylea claim submitted to Medicare Part B in 2013 and 2014 contained a representation of Anti-Kickback Statute compliance, citing gaps in the forms in the record and the absence of actual claims.
  • The court held that materiality is a question of fact under the Supreme Court's Escobar standard and declined to rule that kickback violations are material as a matter of law.
  • Regeneron's motion to strike the amended declaration of CMS employee Dennis Sendros was denied.

A federal judge in Massachusetts ruled Nov. 19 that the United States does not have to prove but-for causation, meaning that the Medicare claims would not have been submitted without the alleged kickbacks, in its False Claims Act case against Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc. on a "false certification" theory. Under that theory, a claim is false because it misrepresents compliance with the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, and U.S. District Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV held that the government need only show the claims were "the reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct."

In the same order, Saylor denied the government's request for summary judgment on two other issues: whether every Medicare claim for Regeneron's drug Eylea in 2013 and 2014 carried a representation of compliance with the kickback law, and whether kickback violations are always material to Medicare's payment decisions. He also denied Regeneron's motion to strike a declaration from Dennis Sendros, an employee of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, or CMS, on which the government relied.

The ruling sets the causation standard for one of two routes to liability in the case. The other route, under a 2010 amendment to the Anti-Kickback Statute, requires proof that a kickback was a but-for cause of a claim, a reading Saylor adopted in 2023 and the First Circuit affirmed on Feb. 18, 2025. On the false certification route, the government still must prove falsity and materiality with evidence that Saylor found incomplete.

The government alleges that Regeneron "improperly funneled millions of dollars to the Chronic Disease Fund," which the order calls "a purportedly independent charitable foundation," to subsidize patient copays for Eylea. According to the government, the purpose was to induce physicians to prescribe more of the drug at the expense of Medicare Part B. Eylea treats wet age-related macular degeneration, "an eye disease that primarily affects elderly people," and is injected into the eye at a physician's office, according to the order.

Regeneron contends that it "donated to a bona fide, independent charity in a manner that complied with the government's regulatory guidance." It also argues that its donations caused no false claims because, among other reasons, the fund awarded assistance first-come, first-served without regard to which approved drug a patient used, and because the fund had enough money to cover Eylea patients in 2013 and 2014 without Regeneron's donations.

On causation, Saylor wrote, "The Court agrees, although the caselaw on this issue is admittedly muddled." He relied on the First Circuit's 2025 statement that under the false certification theory "it is not the AKS violation itself that renders the claim false," but rather "the false representation that there is no AKS violation." Because CMS reimburses claims by procedure code, he wrote, a but-for requirement would force the government to prove the procedure itself would not have occurred without the kickback, which is its burden under the 2010 amendment.

"Specifically, requiring but-for causation would superimpose the 2010 amendment's requirements onto the false certification theory," Saylor wrote. He added that Congress did not write the 2010 amendment to codify earlier false certification cases, citing the Eighth Circuit's observation that Congress "could have selected different language" if it had wanted to do so. He drew the foreseeability standard from First Circuit authority that he said "suggests, although does not directly hold," that the circuit reads the causal language of the False Claims Act that way.

The causation ruling came with a limit. Saylor noted that the government was "simply seeking a legal ruling as to the interpretation of the relevant statute," not judgment on any claim or element, and wrote that "while the Court agrees with the government's interpretation, it will not grant summary judgment in the government's favor as to that issue." The order's conclusion granted the motion only "to the extent" the government sought that legal ruling and otherwise denied it.

On falsity, Saylor rejected Regeneron's argument that claims could not be false where the submitting physicians had no knowledge of the alleged kickbacks. Citing a 2011 First Circuit decision, he wrote that "it is irrelevant whether the submitting physician, who certified compliance, knew that the claim arose from an AKS violation." But he found that "the government has not submitted evidence of any actual Eylea claims submitted during that time period." Saylor also found gaps in the evidence about the forms: the August 2005 version of the paper claim form, accepted through March 31, 2014, contained no kickback certification, and the electronic enrollment and claim forms were not in the record.

On materiality, the question of whether a violation would matter to the government's decision to pay, Saylor wrote that "as a matter of common sense, it seems highly likely that CMS would refuse to pay any claim that arises from the payment of a kickback to a provider." Even so, he wrote, "the Court cannot find that AKS violations are material as a matter of law," citing the Supreme Court's description in Escobar of the materiality standard as "demanding." He held that "the issue of materiality under the FCA is a question of fact."

The government's evidence on that element fell short, according to the order. Sendros's statements addressed current CMS practices rather than those of 2013 and 2014, and Saylor wrote that settlements in other copay charity cases did not establish materiality because the parties "may have agreed to settle those claims for a host of reasons, none of which have any legal effect."

Saylor held that those limits did not require striking the Sendros declaration. Regeneron had argued that Sendros lacked personal knowledge because he was not at CMS in 2013 and 2014. Saylor wrote that the declaration was written in the present tense about current practices that Sendros appeared to know, and concluded, "At worst, his declaration is incomplete or only marginally relevant, but it is not improper and need not be struck."

The amended complaint asserts two False Claims Act counts and a claim of unjust enrichment. In May 2025, after the First Circuit ruled, the government asked to file a second summary judgment motion and to reopen discovery limited to the false certification theory, and Saylor granted the request.

Diane Seol of the United States Attorney's Office represented the United States. David K. Kessler of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP represented Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Falsity, materiality, and foreseeable causation under the false certification theory remain for the government to prove.