Key Points

  • The Seventh Circuit held that a deputy who ran a red light while looking down at his phone or dashboard computer for 15.5 seconds was negligent, perhaps grossly negligent, but the evidence did not support an inference of deliberate indifference to imminent harm.
  • Under County of Sacramento v. Lewis, a substantive due process claim arising from police driving requires intent to harm or deliberate indifference, meaning actual knowledge of imminent harm and a conscious refusal to prevent it.
  • The court held in the alternative that precedent did not clearly establish in January 2020 that an officer's distracted driving violates substantive due process, distinguishing Flores v. City of South Bend and out-of-circuit cases involving criminally reckless driving.
  • The court rejected the estate's argument that the case fell within the narrow 'obvious case' exception to the clearly-established-law requirement.
  • The court held it had appellate jurisdiction even though the district judge did not address the substance of the immunity defense, because the deputy argued only legal questions on agreed facts, and it reversed with instructions to enter judgment for the deputy.

A Milwaukee County sheriff's deputy who ran a red light while looking down at his phone or dashboard computer, killing another driver, cannot be held liable for violating the Constitution, a federal appeals court ruled Wednesday. The court held that the deputy's distracted driving was negligence, not the kind of conscience-shocking conduct that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee forbids.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a federal trial judge in Wisconsin who had ruled that a jury should hear the case. Judge Sykes, writing for a panel that also included Judges Ripple and St. Eve, held that the deputy, Joel Streicher, is entitled to qualified immunity, which shields public officials from damages suits unless they violated clearly established federal law.

The decision directs judgment for Streicher on the federal civil rights claim brought by the estate of Ceaser Stinson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The panel gave two independent reasons. The evidence did not show that Streicher acted with the required intent, and existing precedent had not put officers on notice that distracted driving violates substantive due process.

According to the opinion, Streicher was patrolling in an unmarked Chevy Tahoe on the morning of Jan. 25, 2020, when he approached the intersection of North 10th and West State streets as the light turned yellow and then red. He was driving 29 to 30 miles per hour in a 30-mph zone, but he was looking down and missed the light change. He drove into the intersection from a right-turn-only lane and struck Stinson's car, which was lawfully passing through. Stinson died at the scene.

A Milwaukee Police Department investigator determined that Streicher had about 15.5 seconds to slow and stop. Streicher said he was looking at his dashboard computer, but the police report showed that he unlocked his phone 26 seconds before the crash. Less than 20 minutes earlier, during a stop at the county Safety Building, he had exchanged sexually explicit messages on a dating app, the opinion said. Streicher later resigned and pleaded guilty to homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle.

The governing standard comes from County of Sacramento v. Lewis, a 1998 Supreme Court decision arising from a fatal high-speed police chase. Under Lewis, an officer's driving violates substantive due process, the part of the Fourteenth Amendment that guards against arbitrary abuses of government power, only if the conduct shocks the conscience. Sykes wrote that the plaintiff must show the officer intended to cause injury or was deliberately indifferent, meaning "that he had actual knowledge of imminent harm and consciously refused to prevent it." The Supreme Court in Lewis held that "negligently inflicted harm" falls "categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process."

Judge J.P. Stadtmueller of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin had denied Streicher's motion for summary judgment. The judge ruled that a jury should decide whether Streicher's inattention amounted to a due-process violation and that the immunity question should wait for the verdict. The judge also ruled that Streicher's disciplinary record, including a 2018 misdemeanor conviction and an earlier on-duty crash, was immaterial and inadmissible.

"That was error," Sykes wrote. When an official raises immunity at summary judgment, the plaintiff must show both that the evidence supports a constitutional violation and that the law was clearly established. "These are legal questions for the court," the opinion said. The panel also rejected the estate's request to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that Streicher accepted the agreed facts and argued only about the law.

On the merits, the panel compared the crash with two of its own precedents. In Hill v. Shobe, a 1996 case, an officer speeding after midnight with his headlights off ran a red light and killed a driver. In Lisby v. Henderson, a 2023 case, an officer who merged onto a highway at 33 mph over the limit later struck and killed a pregnant woman walking on the shoulder. The court rejected the due-process claims in both cases.

Streicher's conduct "was less egregious than the conduct alleged in Lisby and Hill, which involved dangerous, high-speed driving by police officers in nonemergency circumstances," Sykes wrote. "Those tragic 15.5 seconds of distracted driving amounted to negligence—perhaps gross negligence." But the agreed facts, read in the estate's favor, "do not support a reasonable inference that Streicher knew of impending harm and consciously refused to prevent it," the opinion said.

The panel held in the alternative that, even if a jury could find the required intent, the law was not clearly established in January 2020. The estate relied on Flores v. City of South Bend, a 2021 Seventh Circuit decision that allowed a claim against an officer who drove 98 miles per hour in a 30-mph zone and ran a red light. Sykes wrote that the Flores decision turned on the officer's intentional decision to drive "blind through an intersection," that the case did not involve distracted driving, and that its facts were extreme.

The court also distinguished out-of-circuit decisions the estate cited. In Browder v. City of Albuquerque, the Tenth Circuit allowed a claim against an officer who, after finishing his shift, drove his cruiser with emergency lights on, saw a light turn red, and sped into the intersection. "A police officer's inattentive driving—even the tragic 15.5 seconds of distracted driving at issue here—is different in kind," Sykes wrote.

The panel also rejected the estate's fallback argument that the case was the "rare 'obvious case'" in which an officer's conduct is clearly unconstitutional even without a closely matching precedent. Streicher's distractedness—"regardless of the source—was negligent, perhaps even grossly negligent; it was not obviously unconstitutional," Sykes wrote.

The Seventh Circuit sent the case back to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for Streicher on the estate's § 1983 claim. The opinion does not address the state-law theories the estate also pleaded, which were not part of the appeal.