Key Points

  • When contracting parties expressly agree that actual damages would be difficult or impossible to ascertain and that a liquidated sum is a reasonable estimate, Tennessee courts now presume the provision is enforceable as liquidated damages.
  • The party seeking to avoid such a provision must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is actually an unenforceable penalty, and the inquiry is objective, measured by circumstances when the parties agreed to the sum.
  • Parties need not supply a metric or calculation explaining how they arrived at the liquidated amount to raise the presumption.
  • Each incremental deposit is judged as of the amendment that set it, and even in the aggregate the $18,917,500 deposit, about 23% of the price, raised no fact question.
  • The court upheld the business court's stay of discovery, rejected the buyer's economic-duress discovery request, reinstated summary judgment for the seller, upheld dismissal of the conversion claim and remanded to the chancery court.

The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled Monday that when parties write into a contract that damages from a breach would be hard to measure and that a fixed sum is a reasonable estimate, courts must presume the clause is enforceable. The decision lets the seller of a Hilton-branded hotel near the Nashville airport keep $18,917,500 in earnest money that a buyer forfeited when the sale collapsed.

Justice Dwight E. Tarwater wrote for a unanimous court, joined by Chief Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins and Justices Holly Kirby, Sarah K. Campbell and Mary L. Wagner. The court reversed the Tennessee Court of Appeals and reinstated summary judgment for the seller, FWREF Nashville Airport LLC, against the buyer, UNI Nashville Airport Hotel LLC, and its assignee, SH Nashville LLC.

The ruling settles who carries the burden when a party claims that a liquidated damages clause, which fixes in advance the amount owed for a breach, is really a penalty that Tennessee courts will not enforce. "To this point, it has remained unclear which party bears the burden of showing a provision is enforceable as liquidated damages or, in the alternative, is an unenforceable penalty," Justice Tarwater wrote. Now the party resisting the clause must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning more probably than not, that it is a penalty.

The parties signed their purchase agreement in October 2019, setting a $79 million price and a $1.75 million deposit. Citing fluctuating land values, an unpredictable economy and a volatile lending market, they recognized that it "would be extremely difficult and impracticable, if not impossible, to ascertain with any degree of certainty the amount of damages which would be suffered by Seller" if the buyer failed to close. They agreed the earnest money was a reasonable estimate of those damages.

Over the next 15 months the parties signed 24 amendments. The amendments raised the price to $82,125,000, added deposits deemed earned by the seller and non-refundable, extended deadlines and ratified the agreement. By the end, the deposits totaled roughly 23% of the price.

On Oct. 21, 2020, the buyer learned that a new Hilton-branded hotel was scheduled to open on the airport grounds in late 2023. The parties signed two more amendments, but the buyer could not close by the Jan. 11, 2021, deadline, and the seller notified it that the agreement had automatically terminated. The buyer sued in April 2022, seeking a declaration that keeping the deposits was an unenforceable penalty.

In Davidson County's business court docket, Chancellor Anne C. Martin stayed discovery and granted summary judgment for the seller, including on its counterclaims for breach of contract and attorneys' fees. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "[t]he language of the contracts stating that the parties agreed that the liquidated damages amounts were a reasonable estimate [was] not sufficient."

The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Tarwater wrote that the presumption rests on freedom of contract and on the parties' written words, with courts "presuming, unless shown otherwise, that the parties meant what they said." The hotel clause's language, he wrote, "in and of itself, is agreement enough to raise the presumption," and the parties ratified it in every amendment. "Plainly said, they agreed on an amount of liquidated damages twenty-four more times," he wrote.

The court also held that parties need not explain how they arrived at the number. "To require parties to provide a metric would be particularly illogical in situations where the reason for stipulating as to damages is that there is no reliable way to estimate damages," Justice Tarwater wrote. The inquiry is objective, he added, and turns on the circumstances when the contract was made rather than on what the parties subjectively believed.

In placing the burden on the challenger, the court cited decisions from Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia and the District of Columbia, along with an Illinois appellate court. It noted that Maine and North Dakota place the burden on the party seeking enforcement.

The buyer had argued that the deposits should be judged in the aggregate and that the total was unreasonable on its face. Justice Tarwater called the argument "thoughtful but not persuasive." The court held that each deposit must be evaluated as of the time the parties agreed to it, and noted that with each extension the seller lost the ability to seek out other buyers. "Here, as the timeframe for closing incrementally increased, so did the potential for damages," he wrote.

Even in the aggregate, the court found no fact question. It acknowledged that courts had found sums smaller than 23% unreasonable but wrote that those cases involved one-time deposits under clauses that did not explain why damages would be hard to ascertain.

The court upheld the stay of discovery, finding the deal's circumstances clear from the record. It also rejected the buyer's bid for discovery into whether the seller knew in advance about the airport hotel, which the buyer said would show it signed the last two amendments under economic duress. That evidence "would shine no light on the theories of economic duress put forth by Purchaser," the court held.

Because the clause was enforceable, the court also upheld dismissal of the buyer's conversion claim, which the Court of Appeals had revived.

Lawyers for FWREF Nashville Airport included Sarah B. Miller. SH Nashville and UNI were represented by Donald Capparella. Emily Hamm Huseth represented five companies, including Belz Investco GP and Mid-America Apartment Communities Inc., as friends of the court.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Davidson County Chancery Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.