Key Points

  • The Tenth Circuit held that the Hermit's Peak/Calf Canyon Fire Assistance Act does not clearly and unequivocally waive federal sovereign immunity for noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering, annoyance and emotional distress.
  • The majority, applying FAA v. Cooper, read the act's phrase "actual compensatory damages" in light of its expedited 180-day claims process, finite appropriation and preservation of the Federal Tort Claims Act as an alternative remedy, and alternatively found the phrase ambiguous.
  • The court held that the act's clause applying New Mexico law to "the calculation of damages" is ambiguous and must be construed against a waiver of immunity, and that the act's adoption of the FTCA's definition of "injury" does not import the FTCA's measure of damages.
  • Judge McHugh dissented, reasoning that the act's cross-reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), together with FEMA's reading of the very similar Cerro Grande Fire Assistance Act, unambiguously requires compensation for all injuries recoverable under New Mexico tort law, including noneconomic harms.
  • The court reversed the district court's judgment setting aside FEMA's final rule and remanded both consolidated cases for further proceedings.

People who lost homes and property in New Mexico's Hermit's Peak/Calf Canyon Fire cannot recover damages for pain and suffering, annoyance or emotional distress from the compensation program Congress created after the U.S. Forest Service started the blaze, a federal appeals court ruled on Nov. 17.

A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed a federal judge in New Mexico who had ordered the Federal Emergency Management Agency to consider and pay claims for such noneconomic harms. Judge Ebel wrote for the majority, which included U.S. District Judge Kathryn H. Vratil of the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. Judge McHugh dissented.

The decision restores FEMA's reading of the Hermit's Peak/Calf Canyon Fire Assistance Act, which the agency announced in 2023 while responding to public comments on its claims regulations. Under that reading, the fund pays for losses such as destroyed property but not for emotional distress, loss of enjoyment or similar harms. The court decided the appeals on an expedited basis, citing "the many claims before the agency seeking recovery under the finite amount of funding Congress has made available."

The fire grew from two Forest Service burns in San Miguel County. Congress found in the act that a prescribed burn set on April 6, 2022, escaped containment amid erratic winds and severe drought, and that a second fire came from a January pile burn that had stayed dormant underground. The fires merged and were declared a major disaster. Congress passed the act on Sept. 30, 2022, and gave FEMA 180 days from the filing of each claim to set the amount it would pay.

Two groups of claimants challenged FEMA's position under the Administrative Procedure Act, which allows courts to set aside agency action that is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. Ten plaintiffs, led by Tobin Dolan, lost their homes and all their possessions. Two others, led by Marianna Lands, had to leave their property because of the fire and later flooding in its burn scar. Lands also suffered a stroke that she attributes to the fire. The district court agreed and set aside FEMA's final rule.

The appeals turned on sovereign immunity, the principle that the United States cannot be sued for money unless Congress clearly consents. Congress plainly consented to some compensation, Judge Ebel wrote, but any "waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign." The analysis begins with a presumption of immunity, the opinion said, and "the district court erred in failing to recognize and to start its analysis with this presumption."

The claimants relied on the act's provision limiting payments to "actual compensatory damages measured by injuries suffered." That provision excludes only pre-settlement interest and punitive damages. The majority found guidance in FAA v. Cooper, a 2012 Supreme Court decision holding that the phrase "actual damages" in the Privacy Act did not clearly cover mental and emotional harm. Read in context, the majority said, the Hermit's Peak language did not clearly cover such harm either.

The majority pointed to the act's stated aim of speedy settlement and its 180-day deadline. "Such a short time frame lends itself to valuing concrete harms, such as destroyed property and necessary repairs," Judge Ebel wrote. The opinion also cited the limited appropriation, warning that "claims for any one or early claimants' noneconomic damages could balloon to large amounts, well beyond the amounts set aside to compensate for lost and damaged property for all claimants."

The majority also noted that victims may instead sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which allows negligence suits against the government and, the court said, could yield noneconomic damages under New Mexico law. Had Congress simply adopted that law wholesale, Judge Ebel wrote, "there would have been no need to pass the Act in the first place because the FTCA was already available." The panel also found ambiguous a clause applying New Mexico law to "the calculation of damages" and construed it in the government's favor.

In dissent, Judge McHugh said the act defines "injury" by cross-reference to the tort claims law, which makes the government liable to the extent a private person would be under state law. Read that way, the dissent said, the act requires compensation for all injuries recoverable under New Mexico tort law, apart from its express exclusions. Judge McHugh noted that FEMA had read very similar language in the 2000 Cerro Grande Fire Assistance Act to require compensation "to the same extent that the plaintiff in a successful tort action brought against a private party under the laws of the State of New Mexico would be compensated."

Judge McHugh also wrote that the majority "cites no factual or legal authority" for its premise that pain and suffering is harder to value than property loss. Even if sound policy reasons existed for treating the two kinds of damages differently, the dissent said, "such policy considerations are for Congress to weigh, not this court." Judge McHugh would have affirmed the ruling for the claimants.

The majority answered that "the Dissent cannot point to any language in the Act that clearly and unambiguously waives sovereign immunity for noneconomic damages." As for Cerro Grande, courts may not defer to an agency's reading of a statute, the majority wrote, "let alone the agency's interpretation of a different statute addressing a different fire." Judge Ebel closed: "Here, we simply find no clear and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity."

The court sent both cases back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. FEMA had told the court that binding arbitration on Lands' claim for economic and noneconomic damages was tentatively set for November 2026.

Caroline W. Tan of the Justice Department's appellate staff argued for FEMA. Benjamin I. Siminou of Singleton Schreiber LLP argued for the Dolan plaintiffs. New Mexico Attorney General Raúl Torrez's office filed a friend-of-the-court brief supporting the claimants.