Key Points

  • The Third District affirmed a final summary judgment finding that Carjavi 2, LLC's $50,000 transfer to Christopher Ruwe was constructively fraudulent under section 726.106(1), Florida Statutes.
  • Ruwe did not dispute that Itria's claim arose before the transfer or that Carjavi was insolvent, leaving only reasonably equivalent value at issue.
  • The court held that the record conclusively showed Carjavi received no reasonably equivalent value for paying the security deposit and six months' rent on a home leased to its owner's family member.
  • The court held that the section 726.109(1) good-faith defense for innocent transferees applies only to actual-fraud claims under section 726.105(1)(a), not to constructive-fraud claims under section 726.106(1).
  • The court declined to consider an indirect-benefit argument raised for the first time in Ruwe's reply brief and said it would affirm anyway because Ruwe failed to produce evidence of an indirect benefit at summary judgment.

A Florida appeals court on Wednesday upheld a ruling that an insolvent company's $50,000 payment, used to cover the security deposit and six months' rent on a home leased to a relative of the company's owner, was a fraudulent transfer as to a creditor that had won a judgment against the company.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a final summary judgment in favor of Itria Ventures LLC, the judgment creditor of Carjavi 2, LLC, and against Christopher Ruwe, who received the $50,000 from Carjavi. Chief Judge Scales wrote the opinion for a three-judge panel that also included Judges Bokor and Gooden. The opinion contains no dissent or separate writing.

Along the way, the panel held that a defense Florida law gives to innocent recipients of a debtor's money does not apply when a creditor sues on a constructive-fraud theory, which requires no proof that the debtor meant to hinder, delay or defraud the creditor. Under that reading, a recipient sued on the theory cannot defeat the claim by showing good faith. The case turns instead on whether the debtor received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer.

The dispute arose in a post-judgment collection proceeding in the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, where Itria pursued Carjavi as a judgment debtor. Ruwe was the impleaded defendant. On Aug. 29, 2025, Judge Peter R. Lopez entered final summary judgment for Itria, finding that the $50,000 was a constructively fraudulent transfer under section 726.106(1) of the Florida Statutes, part of Florida's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, known as FUFTA.

Scales wrote that under that provision a debtor's transfer is fraudulent as to a creditor if "(a) the creditor's claim arose before the transfer, (b) the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent because of the transfer, and (c) the debtor made the transfer without receiving reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer." The court took that formulation from a 2018 First District decision, RREF SNV-FL SSL, LLC v. Shamrock Storage, LLC.

A footnote in the opinion explained the provision's name. Because the statute does not require proof of the debtor's intent to hinder, delay or defraud the creditor, the court wrote, citing a 2002 Fourth District decision, Levin v. Ethan Allen, Inc., section 726.106(1) "is commonly referred to as a 'constructive fraud' statute." For that description the panel cited Wurtzebach v. Flooring Depot FTL, Inc., a 2024 Fourth District ruling.

Ruwe did not dispute, in the trial court or on appeal, that Itria's claim arose before the transfer or that Carjavi was insolvent. That left a single issue for the panel, which reviewed the summary judgment de novo. The issue was whether the record revealed a genuine factual dispute over whether Carjavi received reasonably equivalent value when it gave Ruwe the money.

The panel agreed with the trial court. "The summary judgment record conclusively established that Carjavi received no reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the funds," Scales wrote.

The parties agreed on the purpose of the payment. According to the opinion, Carjavi gave Ruwe the money to pay the security deposit and six months' rent for a residential home leased to a family member of Carjavi's owner. Scales wrote that Itria "presented unrebutted evidence below that Carjavi derived no benefit (economic or otherwise) from paying the lease obligations for its principal's family member." On that evidence, the panel held, the trial court properly found that Carjavi did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the $50,000.

Ruwe also suggested that the trial court erred by not considering his good-faith defense under section 726.109(1). The panel rejected that argument in a footnote that relied on the statute's own text. The defense for innocent transferees, or recipients of a transfer, "applies only to a creditor's claim of actual fraud brought under section 726.105(1)(a), and does not apply to constructive fraud claims, such as Itria's, brought under section 726.106(1)," the court wrote.

The panel also turned away an argument Ruwe raised for the first time on appeal. In his reply brief, Ruwe cited a decision of a federal bankruptcy court in the Middle District of Florida that had applied FUFTA's reasonably-equivalent-value element. He argued that a genuine dispute existed over whether Carjavi received an indirect benefit from paying the lease obligations of its owner's relative.

The court declined to consider the point. "It is well settled, though, that issues raised for the first time in the reply brief are precluded from our consideration," Scales wrote, citing the Third District's 2023 decision in Raffay v. Longwood House Condominium Association.

The court added that the result would be the same even if Ruwe had preserved the argument. Ruwe "failed to meet his summary judgment burden of producing evidence that Carjavi had received an indirect benefit," the opinion said. The court noted that Ruwe had not raised the indirect-benefit issue in his response to Itria's summary judgment motion.

For the allocation of that burden, the panel quoted a 2018 decision of the federal bankruptcy court in the Middle District of Florida, In re Mongelluzzi. That decision states that once a plaintiff proves the debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent direct benefits, "the burden is on the defendant to produce evidence that the debtor indirectly received sufficient, concrete value."

Andrew M. Kassier of Andrew M. Kassier, P.A., represented Ruwe. Paul A. Humbert of the Law Offices of Paul A. Humbert, P.L., represented Itria.

The opinion, filed in case No. 3D25-1852, states that it is not final until the court disposes of any timely filed motion for rehearing. The panel's one-word disposition, "Affirmed," leaves the August 2025 final summary judgment for Itria in place.