COLUMBUS, Ohio (LN) — The Ohio Supreme Court on Tuesday dismissed Attorney General Dave Yost's mandamus action against the Columbus City Schools Board of Education, holding that the parens patriae doctrine cannot support standing in mandamus cases because the doctrine allows the state to sue for indirect injury while mandamus requires a direct benefit to the relator.

The court, in a per curiam opinion joined by four justices, said Yost failed to show he would directly benefit from a writ ordering the school board to provide interim transportation to private and charter school pupils whose families requested mediation after the district declared transportation impractical.

Yost's office did not respond to a request for comment.

The dispute arose after the Columbus City Schools Board of Education determined in June 2024 that transporting an unspecified number of pupils enrolled in charter and private schools was impractical due to a bus-driver shortage. The district made impracticality determinations affecting 1,380 pupils on or after August 6, 2024, according to the opinion, despite a statutory deadline of July 22, 2024.

The attorney general filed this action on September 5, 2024, seeking a writ compelling the school board to provide transportation to and from private or charter schools to each pupil on whose behalf mediation has been requested, continuing until the matter is resolved under the administrative process.

Yost relied solely on the parens patriae doctrine to establish standing. The doctrine, the court explained, allows the state to sue for indirect injury to a quasi-sovereign interest — but that is inconsistent with mandamus jurisprudence, which requires the relator to be directly benefited or injured.

The court also rejected Yost's argument that the case implicated a quasi-sovereign interest in the well-being of a substantial segment of the state's population. The attorney general's merit brief identified only 63 pupils whose families requested mediation but who were not receiving interim transportation, the court noted.

The court explained that although In re Suwinski involved a similar number of affected citizens, the debtor in that case appeared to be operating throughout Ohio. Moreover, a key difference distinguishes Suwinski from this case: the attorney general has broad enforcement powers under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, thereby lending legislative support for the quasi-sovereign interest argued there. No comparable statutory authority exists here, the court said.

The court granted Yost's motion for leave to file rebuttal evidence, denied the school board's motion for leave to submit a rebuttal affidavit, and overruled the school board's evidentiary objections before dismissing the case.

Justice Joseph Deters concurred, joined by Justices Fischer and DeWine, writing separately to criticize what he called the dissent's "expansive theory of standing" that even Yost did not champion. Chief Justice Kennedy filed a partial dissent, joined by Justice Hawkins, arguing that more than a century of caselaw establishes that the attorney general has common-law standing to sue to compel adherence to law.